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PREFACE 
'No man can sit down to write about 
the history of his own times- or 
perhaps of any time- without bringing 
to the task the preconceptions which 
sprin� out of his own character .... 
This is the inescapable condition of 
the historians work, an-d the present 
study is no more exempt from these 
limitations than any other account of 
the events of the past. •l 
The following thesis offers an impression of American 
opinion toward specific events relating to the rise of Nazi 
Germany through an analysis of selected newspaper editorials 
and articles. While the direct influence of public opinion upon 
foreign policy can rarely be documented, there seems to be a 
general agreement that an "intimate" relationship does exist 
between the two.2 This interdependence u-
l
timately generates a
form of symbiosis, which permits an examination of one of these 
areas to lend insight into the other. 
Fundamentally, the relationship between our political 
leaders, the press, and the general public has always been one 
of interaction. "Each is a significant force in its own right, 
Alan Bullock, Hitler-A Study in Tyranny. {United 
States: First Perennial Library, 1971), p. viii. 
Melvin Small, Public O inion and Historians. (Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press, 1970, p-:-T5. 
l 
2 
p 
2 
but all are part of a cycle in· which the leadership continu-
ously seeks support (from) the press and public so that 
effective policy decisions can be made.113 In fact, government
officials and newsmen are so mutually dependent upon one another 
that it is virtually impossible for either to function effectively 
for any length of time without the other's cooperation.4
Though it is beyond the scope of this particular research, 
studies have been done which discuss the government's attempt to 
influence the press.5 This manipulation assumes a variety of
forms, including the controlled release of information through 
White House briefings as well as deliberate 'leaks'. These actions 
are often intended to sway public opinion in a certain direction, 
usually in conformity with the policy which the government has 
already adopted. This further emphasizes the interdependence 
between public opinion and foreign policy, and the symbiotic bond 
mentioned earlier. 
The Federal Government-Daily Press Relationship. 
(Washington, D.C.: The American Institute for Political Communi­
cation, 1967), p. 109. 
Ibid., p. 16. 
For more information consult: George Berdes, Friendly 
Adversaries: The Press and Government. (Marquette University: 
College of Journalism, 1969) or James Reston, The Artillery of 
the Press. (New York: Harper & Row, 1967). 
3 
4 
5 
Turning specifically to the role played by public 
opinion, it normally involves the public defining a broad 
strategy for the government to pursue, and the President in 
conjunction with his administrators seeking to devise the 
measures needed for these goals to be obtained. The State 
Department has openly admitted the influence which public 
opinion has on foreign policy decisions, if not in actually 
initiating the programs themselves, then at least in limiting 
the options available for consideration.6
Editorial opinions are only one of the conduits whereby 
this flow of principles and ideas between the government and 
public can be exchanged. Yet it serves as one of the few sources 
of information for this topic, since modern public opinion polling 
did not come into extensive use in the United States until the 
late 1930 1 s. Thus it is virtually impossible to analyze the 
typical American's attitudes prior to this period except through 
indirect means.7 To support the selection of newspapers as one
of the more significant tools for accomplishing this purpose, it 
should be pointed out that sociologists Robert S. and Helen M. 
Lynd found newspapers to be the single most important medium for 
Small, Public Opinion, p. 15. 
Ralph B. Levering, The Public and American Foreign Policy. 
(New York: William Morrow & Company, 1978), p. 25. For more in­
formation on the drawbacks to public opinion polls-sample size, 
unbiased questioning, etc.- see Charles W. Roll & Albert H. Cantril, 
Polls-Their Use and Misuse In Politics� (New York: Basic Books Inc., 
1972). 
- - -
6 
7 
3 
information during the mid-l930's.8 Furthermore, even as
late as the 1940 1 s studies have shown that up to half of the 
4 
entire American population relied almost exclusively upon the 
daily paper for their news on foreign affairs.9 Consequently,
the papers selected for this study-which represent nearly four 
and a half percent of the total daily newspaper circulation in 
the United States- certainly had a significant influence upon 
their respective regions of the country.lo They served as the
primary filter through which information relating to inter­
national affairs passed to their readers. It is reasonable to 
assume that their interpretations of events in Germany in the 
early 1930 1 s both influenced and reflected the prevailing 
opinion existing in this country at the time. 
While it is not the intention of this work to imply that 
editorial opinions and public opinion should be directly equated, 
it is admittedly difficult to measure and define precisely what 
'public opinion' entails. The selection of editorials and 
articles in this study may provide some indication, in hopes of 
lending greater insight into this area which has yet to be fully 
explored. 
Ibid., p. 23. 
Bernard C. Cohen, The Press and Foreign 
)
olicy. (Prince­
ton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967 , p. 256. 
10 
1937). 
The World Almanac - 1937. (New York: N.Y. World-Telegram, 
8 
9 
5 
INTRODUCTION 
While the German nation was gradually being transformed 
from a troubled republic into an ideological dictatorship, the 
Western World was caught in the midst of a deep depression. In 
light of these domestic problems which were consuming most of 
their attention, it is the purpose of this investigation to attempt 
to assess the extent to which the American public was aware of the 
events occurring in Germany between the years 1930 to 1936. While 
there appears to have been an ample number of warnings of the 
trouble which lay ahead, somehow these signals were never totally 
appreciated in either the United States or Europe - all to the 
advantage of Hitler and the National Socialists. 
The difficulty in assessing the public's general knowledge 
or opinion of what was happening in Germany at this time has pre­
sented a major challenge; yet if one considers the newspaper media 
as not only a device influencing public opinion, but reflecting it 
as well, a solution does become available. By selecting various 
influential papers throughout this country, a cross-section of 
American public opinion can be indirectly approximated. 
The nation of Germany was stunned by the news of an 
armstice in 1918, particularly in view of the military 1 s policy of 
concealing or minimizing reversals to the people. Now the stark 
reality was suddenly thrust upon them, and the typical citizen was 
6 
at a loss to understand what had happened. Feeling confused 
and even betrayed, the people of Germany embarked upon one of 
the most turbulent periods in their history. In attempting to 
come to grips with the challenges of returning to peace, the 
country likewise had to contend with the sanctions imposed by 
the Allies in the Treaty of Versailles. While many historians 
have judged these demands as unreasonable, the victors of 1919 
lacked the advantages of hindsight and found it hard to forget 
the injuries which Germany had inflicted upon them must a few 
years earlier. It was, as Churchill said, an unparalleled 
event in history: 
For four years Germany fought and defied 
the. five continents of the world by land and sea 
and air. The German armies upheld her tottering 
confederates, intervened in every theatre of war 
with success, stood everywhere on conquered terri­
tory and inflicted on their enemies more than twice 
the bloodshed they suffered themselves. To break 
their strength and science and to curb their fury 
it was necessary to bring all the greatest nations 
of mankind into the field against them. Overwhelming 
populations, unlimited resources, measureless sacri­
fice, the sea blockade, could not prevail for fifty 
months. Small states were trampled down in the 
struggle; a mighty empire was battered into unrecog­
nisable fragments; and nearly twenty million men 
perished or shed their blood before the sword· was 
wrested from that terrible hand. Surely, Germans, 
for history it is enough! 1
While German moderates struggled against the armed 
hostility of both the communists and supernationalists to forge 
a democratic republic, the Allies devised a punative treaty which 
l 
Gola Mann, The History of Germany Since 1789. (New York: 
Praeger Publishers, 1968), p. 342. 
7 
the hapless Republicans of Weimar had no choice but to accept. 
The treaty forced Germany to admit sole responsibility for the 
war and to pay reparations to the victors; it limited her army 
and denied her a navy; it decreed the occupation of the Rhineland 
for over 15 years; and it separated the Saar, whose mineral 
wealth was available for France to exploit.2 This harsh agree­
ment, which was designed to preserve peace, contributed towards 
its own destruction. Many Germans felt they had been deceived 
both by the government which now represented them and by the 
Allies who had once offered them a 'just' settlement in the form 
of Wilson's Fourteen Points. 
The mood in Germany was further inflamed by the drastic 
rise in unemployment and inflation. For a country already 
exhausted by war, what were the prospects for millions of demo­
bilized men to be absorbed into the labor market? How could a 
nation deprived of its most valuable industrial areas possibly 
meet the exhorbitant reparations schedule and its nonnal expenses 
as well? It could not. Inflation went rampant throughout the 
country, and the mark collapsed. By 1923, the German currency 
was worth less than one ten-thousandth of its pre-war level, 
and still the treasury printed more money to meet its increasing 
needs. As the rich became richer, the poor became poorer. Social 
unrest spread throughout Germany. 
Ibid., p. 346. 
2 
It was ami.d this atmosphere of tension and strife that 
a man named Adolf Hitler was soon to start his rise to the 
pinnacle of power. One could hardly imagine a less likely 
:B 
candidate to become the leader of Germany than this poorly educated 
son of a humble civil servant; he was not even a citizen of Germany, 
but of Austria. His military record was undistinguished, and at 
the war 1 s conclusion he departed without money, friends, or hope 
for a traditional career. His only major asset was his ability to 
appeal to the common man. 
After initially joining the German Workers• Party in 1919, 
Hitler devoted his incredible energy towards becoming a political 
messiah. His masterful application of propaganda techniques gained 
him the public 1 s attention and increased his party 1 s following. 
In his speeches of 1923, Hitler promoted the belief that the Republic 
was totally corrupt and acting against the interests of the people. 
When the French occupied the Ruhr in that same year, Hitler launched 
a feeble putsch to overthrow the government. While the attempt was 
a complete disaster, it taught him a valuable lesson--he must use 
the system in order to destroy it! 
Following a prison term, during which he wrote Mein Kampf, 
Hitler emerged to bring all the nationalist parties under his 
leadership. From 1925 to 1929, he spent most of his time in 
rightist circles trying to strengthen the party 1 s foundation as 
Germany appeared to be recovering. The collapse of Wall Street in 
October of 1929, however, was especially hard felt in Gennany. 
The growing economic crisis brought Communists and Nationalists 
9 
alike into the streets, each attacking the other and both 
attacking the impotent government under President van Hindenburg 
and Heinrich Bruening. 
A series of events during the 1930's allowed Hitler to 
gain supreme power in Germany and then revitalize her military 
strength. These incidents provide the focal points for each of 
the upcoming chapters, �nd include: ()) the first major Nazi 
victory at the polls in 1930; (2) the Presidential campaign of 
1932; (3) Hitler's appointment to the Chancellorship in 1933; 
(4) the Reichstag fire and its aftermath; (5) the 1 blood purge'
of 1934; (6) Hindenburg's death and the rearmament of Germany; 
and finally, (7) the repudiation of the Locarno Treaty and the 
military takeover of the Rhineland. While naturally there were 
many other events during this period which could have been con­
sidered--such as the German withdrawal from the League of Nations 
in 1933 or the passage of the anti-Jewish "Nuremberg Laws" in 
1935--these selected developments were particularly;crucialJto 
Hitler's attainment of total power and were generally given more 
attention by the press. 
As Hitler proceeded to establish himself in Germany, 
most Americans found themselves preoccupied with the Great 
Depression. Millions of people had lost everything they owned, 
and banks and businesses in general were having to close their 
doors. President Hoover assured the nation that prosperity was 
'just around the corner', but his construction program for public 
10 
highways and buildings fell short of what was needed. The 
country was ready for a change and consequently elected Franklin 
Roosevelt as President in 1932. When he assumed office in early 
1933, he vigorously promoted a series of measures designed to 
get the nation back on its feet. This was part of the 'New Deal' 
which was designed to create new jobs and shift the burden on to 
the backs of those best able to afford it. The economy began a 
slow recovery, and Roosevelt was re-elected by a wide majority 
in the year 1936. 
Although absorbed by these domestic problems currently 
plaguing the nation, Americans were not totally unaware of the 
developments in Europe. Understandably, however, they failed to 
recognize the ominous patterns or appreciate the drastic conse­
quences of Hitler's actions. How much did the public know and 
what was their interpretation? The answer is necessarily imprecise, 
but studies of the editorials included in this survey provide in­
sights into the issue. 
The first portion of each of the upcoming chapters is 
devoted to a basic description of the event itself, which normally 
would have been provided by the Associated Press in most of these 
papers. This information is drawn from the standard works on this 
period, and include: Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictator­
ship (1970); Alan Bullock, Hitler-A Study in Tyranny (1964); 
Joachim c. Fest, Hitler (1973); William L. Shirer, The Rise and 
Fall of the Third Reich (1960). 
11 
Each su_rnmary is then followed by an analysis of the 
editorial commentary offered by the papers themselves. Th.ese 
papers, which were selected both on the basis of their geographic 
locations (attached, p. 12) and their influence, include the 
following: the Atlanta Constitution (circulation 92,897 daily 
and 133,473 on Sundays); the Chicago Tribune (838,422 daily --
1,235,442 Sunday); the Dallas Morning News (89,055 daily --
102,305 Sunday); the Los Angeles Times (162,959 daily -- 246,453 
Sunday); the Minneapolis Tribune (72,263 daily -- 170,704 Sunday); 
the New York Times (437,367 daily -- 752,689 Sunday); the Richmond 
Times-Dispatch (66,848 daily -- 70,005 Sunday); the Rocky Mountain 
News (45,337 daily -- 70,120 Sunday); and the Washington Post 
(76,006 daily -- 86,323 Sunday).3
Offering a wide diversity of opinion on a variety of issues, 
these publications differed both in the quality as well as quantity 
of editorials which they gave to the events in Germany. There was 
never a common editorial voice in any of these key events, and for 
several of the papers (e.g. the Los Angeles Times and Minneapolis 
Tribune), there was little consistency in their interpretations 
from one event to another. 
Directory of News a ers and Periodicals-1930. (Philadel­
phia: N. W. Ayer & Sons, 1930 . 
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Chapter One 
THE REICHSTAG ELECTION 
September 1930 
Narrative of Events 
13 
Arising from the chaotic depths experienced since its 
defeat in the First World War, the German nation by 1929 had 
taken significant strides towards recovery. This accomplishment 
had gradually diluted the elements of discontent upon which 
National Socialism was bred, though almost overnight this situa­
tion was radically altered as the worldwide depression reached 
Germany and the rest of Europe. Now the agitator who had long 
awaited such a dis�ster cited this new crisis as proof that the 
current regime was a failure. Adolf Hitler began to assume a 
position of prominence among the political figures of his day, 
and in the year 1930-for the first time since its inception-
the Nazi Party demonstrated it was a formidable and viable 
political organization. 
The economic crisis resulted in bankruptcy and collapse 
to many small businesses and industries, while causing a drastic 
rise in unemployment and the disruption of German society. Its 
effects were not limited to the working class, but encompassed 
the middle and lower classes, who felt equally threatened with 
the loss of their livelihoods and personal integrity. The 
peasants and far�ers tried desperately but unsuccessfully to 
escape the incessant demands being thrust upon them for rent 
14 
and taxes. As the crisis deepened, the number of people alienated 
by the present administration grew in size and became increasingly 
receptive to the demagoguery of a man like Hitler who expressed 
their frustration so well. 
Under these turbulent conditions, an influential group of 
critics and enemies of the Republic, predominantly from the Right, 
assumed positions of strategic importance from which they led the 
country away from democracy towards a system characterized by one­
party rule. With the failure of the Grand Coalition to reach a 
political compromise in the spring of 1930, Presidential rule was 
swiftly evoked to allow a restructuring of the state toward an 
authoritarian model favored by the Right.1 This provided the
needed excuse for further agitation by various interest groups 
who advocated anti-democratic measures and the institution of a 
dictatorship.2
As the economic situation continued to worsen, the 
Chancellor of the Republic, Heinrich Bruning, dissolved the 
Reichstag for its refusal to support him in his rule. In the 
Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship. (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 171. The Grand Coalition was 
an alliance of Social Democrats, Centre, and left-wing Liberal 
political factions which together formed the basis for a working 
majority in the Reichstag and held the Republic intact. 
Ibid., pp. 170-71. Special interests groups such as 
employer organizations and trade unions were included. 
l 
2 
15 
ensuing election campaign, the Nazis employed numerous imagina­
tive ploys to draw additional strength and attention to their 
cause. The paramilitary arm of the party, the S.A., carried 
the campaign to the streets, plastering posters (or heads) on 
virtually every street corner and holding massive demonstrations 
throughout the country. Hitler, in �urn, provided the people with 
the scapegoats on which to blame their ills-namely, the French, 
the Jews, the Allies, and most especially the Republic.3
To a people drained both financially and emotionally, 
Hitler lent a renewed.sense of vigor and pride. As quoted by 
Alan Bullock, Hitler vehemently stated: 11The Germans are the 
greatest people on earth. It is not your fault that you were 
defeated in the war and have suffered so much since. It is because 
you were betrayed in 1918 and exploited ever since by those envious 
of you ... let Germany awake and renew her strength.114
Election day, September 14th, 1930, marked the turning 
point for Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party. It signified the 'end 
of the reign of democratic parties' and announced the initial 
death.throes of the Republic.5 With roughly 18 percent of the
votes cast in their support, the Nazis surged from only 12 seats 
3Bullock, Hitler, p. 82.
5Joachim c. Fest, Hitler. (New York: Vintage Books, 1975),
p. 287.
4
rbid. 
16 
in the Reichstag to a respectable 107. The Party now found 
itself second only to the Social Democrats, with a legitimate 
claim to the leadership of the Right. All other parties had 
suffered huge and unexpected losses, with the exception of the 
Communists, who received modest gains. 
This surprising Nazi performance convinced not only 
millions of citizens, but business and military leaders as well, 
that perhaps Hitler was indeed the rising star of the future. 
While the party's ideology focused more on action than on a true 
philosophy, it had accomplished what no other party had seemed 
able to do: it had aroused the traditional feelings of the German 
people towards patriotism and nationalism, which were to many 
only a memory. It was, in a word, a success. 
Many of the analysts abroad, both in England and the 
United States, recognized the underlying significance of the 
German election and attributed the results to 11the {deepening) 
crisis of the party, or .... (an) expression of a spreading lack 
of faith in the liberal and capitalist systems, coupled with a 
desire for a fundamental change in all conditions of life. 116 
What they were actually witnessing, however, was a testimony to 
the lesson Hitler had learned much earlier: that even the 
shakiest form of government remained secure against attacks from 
Ibid., p. 288. 
6 
the streets. He was determined, therefore, to play by the 
rules of the system, then try to destroy it. 
* * * * * * * * * * 
Editorial Analysis 
17 
The American press gave relatively little attention to 
the political contest in Germany until after the fact. This· 
apparent lack of concern is not difficult to understand; the lack 
of extensive European coverage that had characterized American 
journalism during the 1920 1 s was now exacerbated by the focus on 
critical conditions at home stemming from the Great Depression. 
Furthermore, the Reichstag election had become significant only 
in retrospect, as even the Germans themselves were surprised by 
the outcome. 
Predominantly the headlines of the papers in this survey 
revolved around several major domestic issues during the period 
leading up to and immediately following the September 14th 
German election. Prohibition was by far the most controversial 
topic at this moment, since the upcoming state elections throughout 
this country brought the matter into bitter debate during these 
campaigns. Another major topic at this time was the nomination 
of Frank B. Kellogg as the American representative to the World 
Court. This drew widespread attention due to the political clout 
of the pacifist movement during the l920 1 s-30 1 s, and the public 
support for military disarmament. Finally, several other events-
18 
including Capta�n Caste's airplane flight from Paris to New 
York and Governor Roosevelt's reported interest in the Presi­
dential nomination- rounded out the basic coverage given to 
domestic matters by the American press.7 However, this is not
to imply the German election went entirely unnoticed, as the 
following analysis will indicate. 
The New York Times provided the most thorough and accurate 
analysis of the Reichstag Election held in 1930. A full week 
before the election, its editorials predicted tremendous gains 
by extremist factions in the Reichstag, though the moderates were 
expected to retain control. 11 In the Reichstag election of Sunday 
week it seems likely that the diehard parties at either end, the 
Communists and Fascists, may make some gains. But a decisive 
majority of the German people continues to stand for (law and) 
order ... (Thus) it is not unreasonable to expect a working majority 
... made up of a coalition of middle parties. 118 Furthermore, the
foreign correspondent for the Times, Guido Enderis, reported in 
an article appearing September 12th that although general specu­
lation tended to concede 'liberal gains' to the Fascists, German 
This information was derived through a sampling �f the 
headlines of the papers included in this study. 
8 
"The Reichstag Campaign," New York Times, 6 September 
1930, p. 14. 
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officials were more optomistic and believed the moderates could 
retain control.9 After the election results were determined,
the Times offered four editorials and six articles concerning 
the outcome, in addition to stories attributed to the Associated 
Press. One of the editorials offered on September 16th noted 
that while the election produced the predicted extremist gains, 
it fell 'noticeably short' of a complete disaster for the 
moderates. The increase in Nazi delegates was attributed to a 
realignment of the ultra-conservative elements within the country 
itself.1° Following this pronouncement, one of the most prophetic
comments about the whole matter was offered in the editorial of 
September 21st, which stated: "If some years back, when (Hitler) 
was arrested for directing the ill-fated Lundendorff Putsch, the 
German authorities had expelled him to his native land, instead 
of imprisoning him and making him a martyr, they would have 
avoided a mistake which they have not been the first to make.1111 
On the eve of the election itself, the Chicago Tribune 
carried a front-page article which accurately forecast the Fascist 
Guido Enderis, 11Moderate·coalition Looked For In Reich," 
New �ark Times, 12 September 1930, pp. 1-2. See Appendix A. 
10 
"The German Elections," New York Times, 16 September 
1930, p. 26. 
11 
Edwin L. James, "Extremes Are Far Apart, 11 New York Times, 
21 September 1930, sec. 3, p. 3. See Appendix A. 
9 
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gains and the failure of the current regime to obtain a working 
majority. As its foreign correspondent, Sigrid Schultz, reported: 
"Politi cal prophets held no hope of a majority for Chancellor 
Heinrich Bruening's .•. republic. The ... campaign leads observors 
to predict a big increase in Fascist seats .... While specific 
issues grip the voters, the fundamental issue at stake is a battle 
between the Communists and Adolf Hitler's Fascists ... (and) between 
them stands the moderate bourgeoisie. 1112 Later editorials went
on to stress the importance of the election, while advising the 
general public to take heart in what it termed a 'temporary 
phenomenon. 1 11 Interpreati on of ... the German election is at this 
distance extra hazardous. What it means to Germany, to Europe 
and to the world must wait upon events .... But for Germany we con­
tinue to have faith in republicanism. The Germans are the most 
stable and orderly people of the continent .... If any people in 
the world are fit for self-government and popular institutions, 
they are.1113 
The Rocky Mountain News, while exceedingly limited in its 
coverage of this matter, showed considerable insight when it 
attributed the loss of support for the government to its inability 
12 
Sigrid Schultz, "Germans Vote Today: l Slain, 8 Dying 
in Riot, 11 Chicago Tribune. 14 September 1930, p. l. See Appendix A. 
13 
"The German Election," Chicago Tribune, 16 September 1930, 
p. 14.
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to halt the spread of hunger and unemployment. In addition, it 
pointed to the growing doubts concerning Hitler's sanity, and 
described the leader of the Fascists as one who is 11irresponsible 
(and) unscrupulous .•.. (and) hates to the point of madness anyone 
resembling a Socialist ... (or) Liberal.1114
Several of the remaining papers in this study drew various 
conclusions about the results of the election, but most failed 
either to anticipate or appreciate its significance. The Washing­
ton Post, for instance, did not appear overly worried about the 
recent results. In response to observors who were suggesting the 
disintegration of the German Republic, it replied in its editorial 
of September 15th: 11The nature of the radicals' gains suggests 
they are temporary ... and the moderate parties can keep Germany 
headed in the right direction if they lay (their) petty rivalries 
aside. 1115 Yet as the accompanying editorial cartoon illustrates,
there was some doubt as to the direction in which the Republic was 
going- particularly in view of the current internal rivalry among 
the various political factions and the 'grip' the Fascists now 
had over the country.16
14 
"Rumblings of War From Germany,11 Rocky Mountain News, 
17 September 1930, p. 6. 
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"The German Elections,11 Washington Post, 15 September 
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James North, 11Too Many Political Links," Washington Post, 
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The Atlanta Constitution concurred in this analysis,
and credited much of Hitler's success to his 'silver-tongued
22 
Oratory I a d ' 1 · · t d · 11 · k · 
· • 17n un 1m1 e w, 1ngness to ma e reckless promises. 
While citing the ominous overtones of the election results, the 
Constitution neverthe 1 ess endorsed the abi 1 ity of the moderates ·.to 
regain control of the government in the period ahead. Their 
foreign correspondent, Frederick Kuh, quoted one government source 
as saying: "Despite the election results I do not for a moment 
perceive a menance to the republican constitution, the public 
safety or the foreign policy. It is absolutely out of the question 
that the radical parties that emerged victors at the polls should 
be given a chance to try out their recipes for government. 1118 
The Los Angeles Times regarded this event as merely a 
consequence of too many parties vieing for power simultaneously. 
It believed this condition was brought about by the government's 
attempt to continue to meet the reparations schedule, predominantly 
through fiscal cuts and a drastic increase in taxes. The Times 
noted that this policy was extremely unpopular among the people, 
and a mood for 'change' was created throughout Germany. Numerous 
political factions arose in response, each of them hoping to achieve 
a significant backing. "The radical parties are only agreed upon 
17 
Henry K. Norton, "The Background of Foreign Affairs, 11 
Atlanta Constitution, 21 September 1930, p. 12. See Appendix A. 
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Cabinet," Atlanta Constitution, 16 September 1930, pp. 1 & 4. 
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one point, opposition to the government, and it seems impossible 
that they will be able to form a coalition ministry with no 
better rallying point than this.1119
The Richmond Times-Dispatch offered a similar interpre­
tation, though on a far more simple level. In its editorial of 
September 17th, the Times-Dispatch attributed the latest Fascist 
gain to what it termed merely a 'matter of taxation.• Feeling 
that one guess was probably as good as another in terms of explain­
ing the recent election results in Germany, the following supposition 
was offered: 11The problem is not a very complex one of statecraft 
or international diplomacy. It is very simple. The German of 
twenty-two, say, who was a lad of six when the war started and only 
ten when it ended, cannot marry the girl of his choice because so 
much of his earnings .•. go to ... indemnity. Any alternative would 
be preferable to this condition of slavery.11 20
Of the two remaining papers, the Dallas Morning News seemed 
more preoccupied with the potential changes in government structure 
(i.e. realignment of the Cabinet and the possibility that Chancellor 
Bruening would govern without Parliament) that might occur, instead 
of the change in attitude that had already been demonstrated by the 
German people. "The next few days will be deeply important in 
Germany. Can a new Cabinet be formed, able to control a real 
19 
"Too Many Parties," Los Angeles_ Times, 16 September 1930,
sec. 2, p. 4. 
20 
"A Matter of Taxation," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 17 Septem-
ber 1930, p. 8. 
majority in the Reichstag, or will the turmoil of clashing 
parties drive Germany also into the list of modern dictator­
ships?1121
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Finally the Minneapolis Tribune devoted only a minimal 
amount of attention to the election; with the exception of one 
or two articles by the Associated Press, it ignored the develop­
ments abroad and strictly concentrated on domestic and local 
issues. Within the next several years the Tribune would expand 
its coverage of the events in Germany, but for now it made little 
or no effort to enlighten its readers on this matter. 
Hitler's increasing strength in the Reichstag election 
was thus greeted with mixed reaction by the American press. 
Although the journalists concurred in their findings that the Nazi 
gains were unfortunate, they formed no consensus about the implica­
tions to be drawn from this election. Furthermore, only four of 
the papers within this survey offered extensive coverage of this 
event (See Appendix B), and the Chicago Tribune and New York Times 
were the only ones which correctly anticipated the extremist 
victory. 
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Chapter Two 
THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN 
March - April 1932 
Narrative of Events 
26 
After dramatically bursting upon the national scene iri 
-1930, Hitler and the National Socialist Party sought to consoli­
date their power and make further efforts to entrench themselves
within the political system. While there were many challenging
problems still ahead, none was to prove any more pivotal than
the Presidential election of 1932. As the level of unemployment
spiraled to an incredible 6 million workers (25 percent), the
general misery of the people provided Hitler with the opportunity
to seek to remove the legendary Hindenburg. The Fuhrer did not
make this decision easily; should he lose, the Party's image of
invincibility could be permanently shattered. But once committed,
Hitler threw himself wholeheartedly into the race for the Presi­
dency as simply a 'risk that must be taken.11
There were four principal candidates vying for power in 
this election. Field Marshall van Hindenburg, Protestant, 
Prussian, and conservative, garnered most of his support from the 
Socialists, trade unions, and various elements of Bruning 1 s Centre 
William Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich.
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 157.
------- .. -- ~----~ 
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Party and the liberal democratic factions. Adolf Hitler, 
Austrian and Catholic by birth, enjoyed the backing of the 
Junker agrarians and a number of monarchists, in addition to 
the support of his own followers and the lower-to-middle classes. 
Theodor Duesterberg represented the Nationalist Party and had 
little support outside it; Ernst Thaelmann, the Communist 
candidate, competed with Hitler for the votes of the lower 
_classes and the unemployed.2 
Almost instantly the Nazis embarked upon a propaganda 
campaign that was unlike anything ever witnessed before in 
Germany. Financially secure with the newly acquired backing of 
numerous industrialists and extremely well organized, the Hitler 
campaign was a veritable blitzkreig that rolled over Germany. 
Hitler and some of his most emphatic speakers set out across 
the country to whip up the fever of a downtrodden people. Soon 
whole cities and towns seemed to be plastered with the bright red 
coloring of the Nazi emblems and symbols. Thousands of phonograph 
records could be heard spouting their slogans, and theatre owners 
were pressured into showing Nazi movies before the regular features. 
Nearly eight million pamphlets were distributed, and an additional 
twelve million copies of the Party newspaper were also circulated. 
Over three thousand meetings were staged each day, and swarms of 
2 
Ibid. 
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s�s. units could be seen streaming through the streets behind 
vehicles equipped with loudspeakers to pronounce the National 
Socialist philosophy. It was what the propaganda minister, Dr. 
Joseph Goebbels, called a "war of posters and banners.11
3 
Hitler employed all of his demagogic gifts in one 
supreme effort to reach the pinnacle of power within Gennany; 
only the aged Hindenburg and his Chancellor, Heinrich Bruning, 
-·remained in his way. Hitler underestimated the resolve of the
Chancellor, however, who launched an effective campaign of his
own to win re-election for the President. He proved astute and
ruthless enough to reserve all radio time on the government­
controlled networks to combat the Nazi barrage of verbal assaults. 
Hindenburg himself made only one speech, but obviously it had a 
far greater impact on a captive audience. 
When the results were finally tabulated from the March 
13th election, the Nazis were dealt a severe setback. Hindenburg 
had achieved an impressive plurality, with his 49.6 percent of 
the vote compared to Hitler 1 s 30.l percent. The Conservative 
Duesterberg received a meager 6.8 percent, and the Communist 
Thaelmann garnered only 13.2 percent of the total. Because 
Hindenburg had fallen short of the required majority, however, 
another election had to be held to determine a conclusive winner. 
Fest, Hitler, p. 318. 
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While most in the Nazi party were dejected by the 
outcome, Hitler immediately threw himself back into the thick 
of things, proclaiming: "The first election campaign is over. 
The second has begun today. I shall lead it. 114 Since a manda­
tory truce on all the electioneering had been declared until 
April 3rd, Hitler chartered a plane to make maximum use of the 
time that was left. At numerous rallies in cities throughout 
.. the country, the slogan 11Hitler over Germany 11 became the cry, 
reinforcing the implied link between the Nazi leader and the 
Omnipotent.5 
But the results on April 10th confirmed the simple 
reality that Hitler did not have the support among the general 
populace that his fanatical followers themselves supplied. 
Hindenburg captured a decisive 53 percent of the vote, while 
Hitler could only manage a respectable 36.8 percent. The majority 
he so desperately wanted still eluded him, though in the course 
of just two short years he had more than doubled the strength of 
the Nazi party. Now both the Republic and the Party found them­
selves at a pivotal point in their development and only time 
would tell which would succeed in the years ahead. 
* * * * * * * * * * 
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Editorial Analysis 
The German election of 1932 commanded attention in the 
media throughout the world as a classic struggle between the 
forces of left and right developed. Yet again the domestic 
events occurring in this country dominated the newspaper headlines. 
One of these incidents in particula�, the kidnapping of the 
Lindbergh baby, dwarfed all other news items during this interval. 
- As the drama continued to unfold, the papers inundated their
readership with assorted angles and details of this tragedy.
Prohibition also resurfaced on the front-page, as the House of
Representatives passed a bill legalizing beer, while rejecting a
similar proposal to allow the individual states to regulate the
sales of liquor.6
In regards to the coverage rendered by the American press 
on the recent German election, their interpretation of the final 
results showed remarkable variety. One particular segment viewed 
the continued rise in popular support for Hitler as a sign of his 
growing strength, while another regarded the Hindenburg victory 
as a symbol in itself of the return to conservatism. A third 
category of opinion appeared to be indifferent to the entire 
matter, drawing little significance from the election in either 
direction. 
This information was derived through a sampling of the
headlines of the papers included in this study.
------------
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Only two of the papers within this study correctly 
judged that the returns from this election could hardly be 
interpreted to mean an end to Hitler's career, despite his 
obvious failure in the bid for the Presidency. One of the two, 
the Rocky Mountain News, was quick to point out that Hitler 
actually received twice as many votes in this election as he 
had two years earlier. 11 Considering the near mythical awe in 
which the aged van Hindenburg is held by the German people ... 
the 49.6 percent of the voters supporting the government is a 
very small margin of safety for the republic. 11 Furthermore, 
a continuation of this trend would eventually allow the Nazis 
to assume power peacefully. Thus Germany had escaped revolu­
tion only by precariously balancing itself between the Fascist 
and Cormnunist parties.7 A subsequent editorial went on to
speculate: "Unless America, Britain, and France permit a 
reparations-waf debts settlement and a tariff-trade readjust­
ment allowing the German Republic to live, the German people 
doubtless will turn to Hitler and his militarist for self­
preservation.118 
Along a similar vein, the Dallas Morning News captured 
the real dilemma facing the German voter in this election in 
• 11Toward German Chaos, 11 Rocky Mountain News, 16 March 
1932, p. 6. 
p. 4.
11German Fascists, 11 Rocky Mountain News, 13 April 1932, 
8 
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deciding the direction which the country should take through 
its editorial cartoon of March 13th (attached, p. 38).9 The
results clearly revealed the National Socialists had scored an 
'amazing' victory at the polls and could expect growing support 
in the future. Hitler's loss to Hindenburg meant the "Republic 
has merely postponed coming to grips with the Nazis.1110 While
this analysis of the situation in Germany may appear almost super­
ficial, it contrasts sharply with the more common editorial opinion 
which tolled the death knoll for Nazism. Certainly not everyone 
was convinced that the 'threat' was over and that Europe could 
once again feel at rest- as the question mark in the editorial 
11cartoon of April 12th would indicate (attached, p. 39). 
Many of the papers, however, shared the belief that the 
German Republic was safe again in the hands of the moderates. 
The Atlanta Constitution, for instance, regarded the Hindenburg 
victory as a decisive indication that "the German scales are 
(finally) balancing to a safe and sane basis ... emphasizing the 
John Knott, "The Language of Whiskers, 11 Da 11 as Marni ng
News, 13 March 1932, sec. 3, p. 10. See Appendix A. 
10 
"Germany Looks Ahead," Dallas Morning News, 15 March 
1932, sec. 2, p. 6. 
11 
John Knott, "Going Down for the Last Time?," Dallas 
Morning News, 12 April 1932, sec. 2, p. 2. 
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fact that not only Germany but all of Europe is getting back to 
a conservative b�sis.1112 A later editorial went on to note that
the Gennan people have 'refused to be swept off their feet' by 
Hitler and National Socialism, thus accounting for their verdict 
at the polls. 13
The Chicago Tribune concurred in these observations, and 
further surmised: 11Hitlerism will continue to be a disturbing 
factor, no doubt, but at least to outside observation, it does not 
seem to be a force likely to grow (in the future).11 Moreover, 
with an increasing sense of cooperation among the European com­
munity-particularly on the issue of reparations- the prospects of 
both stability and recovery in Germany appear bright.14 This
conjecture by the Tribune would, in effect, mean that one of 
Hitler's chief weapons- the general discontent of the people­
would be removed. 
The Washington Post was even more confident that Hitler 
had at last made a fatal error. In its editorial of March 1st it 
12 
11The German Election, 11 Atlanta Constitution, 15 March 
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stated: 11 In allowing himself to be drawn into the presidential 
race Adolf Hitler made the greatest mistake of his career. He 
will be hopelessly defeated, and the prestige of his party in the 
Reichstag will doubtless undergo a considerable shrinkage .... 
Germany may owe her salvation to the fate which drove the leader 
of the Nazis into (this) campaign. 11 1 5 A subsequent editorial
went on to stress that National Socialism was never a constructive 
-ideology in the truest sense of the word; rather Hitlerism was an
'emotional expression of resentment' derived from the injustices
imposed at Versailles. Thus Hitler's recent defeat at the polls
confirmed that reason and common sense still prevailed in Germany.1
The New York Times concurred with this position, and 
pointed out that the 11main argument for (the) fair treatment of 
Germany ••. is that the German people must not be driven into the 
arms of Hitler. 11 1 7 Realizing the Allies were at lea_st partially
to blame for the current malady in Germany, the Times correspondent, 
Edwin James, noted the Republic was at a 'crossroads.• 1 8 Yet with
15 
16 
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the eventual defeat of Hitler in the election, the Times 
editorial of April 11th concluded: "(The Republic) under the 
auspices of President Hindenburg ... and with the determination 
of the German people behind the Bruening Government, there can 
be little doubt that German internal questions will be dealt 
with successfully. 1119
The Richmond Times-Dispatch was equally optomistic about 
-the situation and cavalierly dismissed the entire Nazi threat as
more vocal than actual in nature. 11To the rest of the world,
the election should be a warning not to heed too much the propa­
ganda of radicalism .... In America we are too frequently led to 
misjudge the strength of popular trends by the noise of agitators 
who do not represent the sound sense of the body politic.1120
The Minneapolis Tribune, on the other hand, vacilated 
in its prediction of the course which Germany and National 
Socialism would take. In one editorial just prior to the election 
it had suggested National Socialism was inevitable; even if Hitler 
were defeated in his quest for the presidency, the dream would 
continue. "The German electorate may reject Adolf Hitler in the 
first balloting of their presidential election today, but they 
cannot, by virtue of their ballots, defeat Hitlerism .... For it is 
19 
"Germany Stands Fast, 11 New York Times, ll April 1932,
p. 14.
20 
"The German Election," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 15 March
1932, p. 8. 
founded on what is the dream and the hope of a large part of 
the German peop.le. 1121 Ironically, however, a few days later 
after the election, the Tribune boldly proclaimed that the 
voters had emphatically rejected both Hitler and Fascism. 
11Looked to all over the world as a serious test of the German 
republic, this election was a more convincing rejection of 
Fascism, as it was represented by Adolf Hitler, than had been 
36 
-looked for by any one. 1122 This drastic shift in position by the
Tribune, within only a two day period, seems difficult to under­
stand even in retrospect.
The final paper in this survey, the Los Angeles Times, 
deserves a category all its own since it presented an opinion 
quite different from the others. The Times, which gave meager 
coverage to the election itself, judged the issue of Nazi violence 
during the campaign as hardly more serious than the episodes which 
occurred in a typical American city like Chicago. In fact, the 
Times went on to say that 11it may be that (the) Nazi violence is 
23being exaggerated." 
21 
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To summ�rize the coverage rendered by the American press 
on these latest developments, the growing disparity of opinion 
needs to be reiterated. Furthermore, despite the fact that the 
papers in this study greatly increased the amount of coverage 
they offered to their readers (see Appendix B), only the Dallas 
Morning News and Rocky Mountain News accurately interpreted the 
results. 
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Chapter Three 
THE CHANCELLORSHIP 
January - February 1933 
Narrative of Events 
The Nazi campaign in 1932 strongly emphasized that 
-destiny had preordained their eventual assumption of power.
This proposition was seriously undermined by the defeats they
suffered in both the presidential and parliamentary elections
of that year. The Party and its leader ultimately owed much
of their success to the lack of nerve and action by their
opponents. · In the November election to the Rei chstag, the
people of Germany displayed their disillusionment with the Nazi
myth when they cast 2 million fewer votes for the Party than
they had in the earlier April contest. The Nazis lost 34 seats
in the Reichstag, their first setback in over two years. The
'march to victory' appeared to be losing its momentum, but
Hitler still refused to consider any overtures from the govern­
ment. Thus the Chancellor was left with only two viable alter­
natives, to dissolve the Reichstag or revise the constitution.
As van Papen laid plans to use both presidential and 
military powers to ban opposing political parties like the Nazis 
and Communists, his untrustworthy ally, General Kurt van Sch­
leicher, began negotiations of his own with the National 
41 
Socialists to fo�m a government under his personal control. 
1
On November 17th, von Papen, acting on the General's advice, 
resigned from the Chancellorship in order to expedite talks 
between Hindenburg and the Nazi leaders directly. When, as he 
anticipated, these discussions ended in failure, von Papen 
expected to be recalled to office in order to implement his 
bold program of constitutional reform and virtual dictatorial 
rule. He was distressed to find that the Wiley von Schleicher 
had persuaded the aged Hindenburg that the only chance to avoid 
a civil war was to name him Chancellor, which he did on December 
2nd. 
While van Papen and Schleicher were embroiled in their 
continuous plots, the Nazi Party itself seemed headed towards an 
all time low. The disappointments at the polls had bred dis­
content among the rank and file members, and the exorbitant 
campaigns had depleted their treasury.2 This situation was
further exacerbated when the dynamic Gregor Strasser resigned 
from the Party in a dispute over the direction in which it was 
headed. Suddenly the entire upper echelon was thrown into 
turmoil and Hitler once again acted to grasp victory out of 
defeat. Swiftly he began to tighten his control over the entire 
Fest, Hitler, pp. 349-50. 
Ibid., p. 352. 
2 
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organization and to embark upon a national campaign to restore 
his followers' faith in the Nazi ideology. 
Meanwhile the van Schleicher government was experiencing 
serious difficulties, failing to achieve the support it had 
anticipated from assorted political factions. The concessions 
made to labor were insufficient to earn the backing of the Social 
Democrats, and the Catholic Centre was too concerned about retaining 
- its own power to worry about the problems of others. The powerful
landlords of the east were alienated by the government's continuing
investigation into fraudulent use of land subsidies, and the Com­
munists were screaming they would rather see the Nazis in control
than lift a single finger in defense of the Republic.3
But ultimately it was a single man, the ex-Chancellor von 
Papen, who played the decisive role in bringing down von Sch­
leicher's government. Having set his mind on revenge, Papen 
approached Hitler with a proposed coalition between the German 
Right and the National Socialists, jointly headed by the two men. 
Hitler unflinchingly demanded the Chancellorship and von Papen 
agreed, but only after Hitler promiied to strengthen the office of 
the Vice-Chancellor which would fall to van Papen. These addi­
tional powers led Papen to believe he would still retain the 
control of the government and that Hitler could be easily contained. 
Using persuasive arguments with the aged Field Marshall, threats 
to his son, and intimidation towards everyone else, the two 
Bullock, Hitler, p. 138. 
politicians fin�lly gained for Hitler his foremost aim, the
legal assumption of power.4 Now Hitler could proceed to make
radical changes upon the state, entirely with its approval, 
even if it resulted in its eventual destruction-and that was 
precisely his intent! 
* * * * * * * * * * 
Editorial Analysis 
43 
While the significance of Hitler's appointment to the 
Chancellorship in 1933 drew widespread attention, American news­
papers were generally preoccupied with the various reform measures 
being considered by President-elect Franklin Roosevelt. Most of 
these proposals were concerned with getting the economy back on 
its feet, including the devaluation of gold and a new war debts 
settlement. A bankruptcy reform bill also passed Congress, and a 
huge development project to put 200,000 people back to work was 
suggested for the Tennessee Valley.5
In regards to the coverage given to Hitler's newly acquired 
position, there seemed to be a prevailing skepticism among the 
editorial opinions as to whether or not the conservatives in 
4 
Shirer, Rise! Fall of the Third Reich, p. 187.
5 
This information was dervied through a sampling of the
headlines of the papers included in this study. 
--- -- --- ---- ----
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Germany could retain control and keep the National Socialists 
in check. The achievement of what Hitler had termed the 'legal' 
revolution was largely ignored, and most of the papers in this 
survey seemed unable to explain either the success or the direction 
of Hitler and Germany. The number of editorials written on this 
event was surprisingly small, though the readers were inundated 
with articles from the Associated Press, which reported a detailed 
_narrative of the events. 
Several of the papers included in this study took a 
pessimistic approach to this latest development in Germany. The 
Chicago Tribune regarded Hitler's ascendancy with grave reserva­
tions, feeling it presented a danger still to be reckoned with. 
"The demonstrations grew to riotous proportions in many cities 
when inhabitants ... showed their resentment to Hitler's regime .... 
It was evident that Hitler's ascendancy (has} sharply divided the 
nation. 116 The Dallas Morning News was even more bleak in its 
outlook, stating that Germany was definitely 'swinging' towards 
a dictatorship.7 Furthermore, unless a working majority could be
obtained in the Reichstag, its repeated dissolution seemed inevit-
\;grid Schultz, "Rule of Hitler Is Opened With Riots -
4 Slain," Chicago Tribune, l February 1933, p. 1. 
7 
Joseph Willets, "The World in Review - Germany," Dallas 
Morning News, 29 January 1933, sec. 3, p. rn. See Appendix A. 
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able and a continuation of 11the virtual dictatorship of the 
Hitler ministry11 unavoidable.8
The Minneapolis Tribune expressed the belief that it 
would be impossible to predict the outcome of this latest political 
jostling, though it did consider this event an important test for 
Hitler. ln its editorial of January 31st, the Tribune stated that 
Hitler's recent appointment to the Chancellorship may indeed hold 
-the 'key' to his future career in politics. 11Although the rise 
of the Nazi movement has been rapid, the personal influence of 
Hitler is said to be on the wane .... Whether the present episode 
means the beginning of the end for Adolf Hitler personally, or 
whether it will enable him to climb (even) higher, remains to be 
seen.11 9
The New York Times and Washington Post were more guarded 
in their assessment of the·recent developments in Germany. In 
an article by the Times correspondent Guido Enderis appearing on 
January 29th, the possibility of a government under the leadership 
of Hitler was mentioned as only one of several options still avail­
able to Hindenburg at this time.10 On the day following Hitler's
11German Election," Dallas Morning News, 3 February 1933, 
sec. 2, p. 2. 
11 Hindenburg and Hitler, 11 Minneapolis Tribune, 31 January 
1933, p. 10. 
10 
Guido Enderis, 
11Schleicher Quits As Cabinet Head,1
1
New York Times, 29 January 1933, pp. 1-2.
8 
9 
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appointment, however, the Times editorial conceded that Germany 
had now embarked upon a 'perilous adventure.' 11 (Yet) anxiety 
will not be relaxed nor vigilance abated so long as it is uncertain 
whether the new Chancellor ... is going to urge and seek the ... people 
of Germany to take a leap into the dark.1111 The Washington Post
was equally realistic when it concluded that there was slim hope 
for either political or economic stability in Germany until Hitler 
was given a trial. "There is every reason to hope that this govern-
ment will be given a chance to rule, for, whether there is agreement 
with his policies or not, there is little (possibility) for a 
restoration of political peace and orderly economic recovery 
until (this regime) has been given a trial.1112 Yet the foreboding
. question which the Post ultimately left for its readers to decide 
was "what aspirations ... have been kindled and powers (set) loose by 
the Hitler ascendancy? 1113 Only time would tell.
A few of the papers included in this survey were actually 
optomistic about the situation now unfolding. The Atlanta Consti­
tution informed its readers that there was little to fear from 
Hitler. "It is (far) more likely that, having achieved power, he 
will adopt a middle course in the effort to enlist strength from 
11 
"Germany Ventures," New York Times, 31 January 1933, p. 16.
12 
"Chancellor Hitler,
11 Washington Post, 31 January 1933, p. 6.
13
"Another German Election,
11 Washington Post, 5 February 1933,
p. 6.
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both radicals and conservatives (alike).1114 Moreover, the
Constitution went on to add in its editorial a few days later 
that it did not consider many of Germany's demands (i.e. parti­
cularly on the issue of increasing her military strength and 
capability) to be unreasonable.15
The Richmond Times-Dispatch concurred in this belief 
that Hitler's 'wings have been clipped', and he could easily be 
brought to his knees if his policies proved unsatisfactory. A 
battered Germany might be willing to give Hitler a try (see the 
editorial cartoon of February 4th attached - p. 50), but: 
"German labor is ready to declare a general strike ... the Communists 
are in open rebellion ... a majority of the Cabinet (which Hitler) 
has been forced to accept (is) ready to curb him to preser.ve the 
national finances •.. (and) Hindenburg, who named Hitler Chancellor, 
can as quickly unmake him.11 16 With all these restrains taken
into consideration, there seems to be ample reason for the Times­
Dispatch's positive position. The paper likewise noted, as 
ingeniously depicted in an editorial cartoon carried February 1st, 
14 
"The New PreinieY.:s,11 Atlanta Constitution, 31 January
1933, p. 4. 
15 
"Germany on Arms, 11 Atlanta Constitution, 2 February
1933, p. 6. 
16 
"Hitler Takes the Reins,11 Richmond Times-Dispatch,
1 February 1933, p. 6. 
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that Hitler was.in reality little more than a poor imitati
on 
of two truly powerful men in Europe, Stalin and Mussolini.
17 
Hitlerism was simply much bigger than Hitler; and for Germany to 
be brought 11under his heel, it would require more iron than (we)
believe is in his system. 1118 
The remaining two papers, the Los Angeles Times and the 
Rocky Mountain News, devoted the least editorial space to this 
latest news from Germany. Each of these major publications limited 
their analysis and interpretation of Hitler's appointment to a 
single editorial. The Times seemed convinced that the Junkers had 
allowed Hitler this opportunity to run the government in order to 
provide him with a chance to cut his own throat. "The Junker 
politicians believe the only way to squelch this upstart.is to 
let him kill himself trying to run the government. They will then 
argue that events of several years have demonstrated the impossi­
bility of parliamentary government in Germany, and end the whole 
19 affair with a coup d'etat. 11 The Rocky Mountain News expressed
17 
Fred Seibel, 11Hitler: Two In One, 11 Richmond Times-Dispatch,
l February 1933, p. 6. See Appendix A.
18 
11Hitler: Two In One, 11 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 3 February
1933, p. 8. 
19 
11 Hitler Takes Power, 11 Los Angeles Times, 31 January 1933,
sec. 2, p. 4. 
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a similar view �hat Hitler was more of an imagined, than real, 
threat to peace- yet it also noted that the Allies were 
partially to blame for this malady by their injustice at 
Versaille to Germany. "Hitler is not the cause of anything; 
he is merely a symptom-a dangerous symptom.11
20
As the drama continued to unfold, the American press was 
starting to hedge more and more in its predictions of the direction 
in which the Fuhrer was leading Germany and the rest of Europe. 
This, in turn, created a natural disparity in editorial opinion, 
which provides one of the major focal points of this study. 
20 
"Herr Hitler," Rocky Mountain News, l February .1933, p.
1 o. 
50 
Fred Seibel, 11Taking on the Pilot,
1
1 Richmond Times-Dispatch,
4 February 1933, p. 6. 
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Chapter Four 
THE REICHSTAG FIRE AND AFTERMATH 
February - March 1933 
Narrative of Events 
52 
Hitler's strategy of seeking a legal revolution eventually 
paid off handsomely when he assumed the office of Chancellor on 
January 30, 1933, and at last found himself in the position to 
put his plans into action. His first major objective was to 
neutralize any potential opponent who might seriously challenge 
his control of the government or the direction in which he was 
leading the state. Since the combined backing of the Nazis and 
Nationalists failed to afford him the majority he needed in the 
Reichstag, he knew this situation would have to be remedied. The 
Communist Party, which held 100 seats in the parliamentary body, 
became Hitler's target; if somehow they could be eliminated, he 
would finally have the majority which had so long eluded him. 
New elections were set for March 5th, and for once the 
Nazis had all the resources of the state behind them in order to 
recruit voters. They intended to win a mandate from the people. 
Unofficially most of the Nazi leaders hoped the Communists would 
cause a flare up which would enable them to move against them. 
As Goebbels candidly remarked: "We (will) lay down the line for 
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the fight again�t the Red Terror. For the moment we shall 
abstain from direct counter-measures. The Bolshevik attempt 
at revolution must first burst into flame. (Then) at the proper 
moment we wi 11 strike. 111 
Despite ample provocations, the Communists refused to 
act, and so the Nazis took the offen�ive, beginning with a raid 
upon the Communist headquarters in Berlin. The tremendous amount 
of propaganda material they discovered gave rise to charges that 
an insurrection was being planned; this in turn caused more rumors 
to spread throughout the country. The mood was exactly right for 
the next provocation, none other than the firing of the Reichstag. 
It was the night of February 27th when a bright glow 
appeared over the city, directly above the Reichstag; even before 
the flames were extinguished, the Nazi leaders had already accused 
the Communists of arson. Though the exact circumstances surround­
ing this event have never been completely unraveled, a pathetic 
half-witted Dutchman by the name of van der Lubbe was promptly 
arrested and charged with the offense. Exploiting his ties to the 
Communist Party, the Nazis quickly attacked their rivals of the 
extreme Left; several of the leading communist officials were 
arrested and held indefinitely in 'protective' custody, while a 
ban on all their publications was strictly enforced. 
\hirer, Rise & Fall of the Third Reich, p. 190. ---
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On the following day, February 28th, Hitler prevailed 
upon von Hindenburg to sign a special emergency decree that 
would allow him to proceed against those presenting a direct 
threat to the state. This single act suspended many individual 
liberties guaranteed under the Constitution, curtailing freedom 
of expression and assembly, permitting censorship of mail and 
other communications, suspending the need for warrants to conduct 
searches of private homes, and allowing the confiscation and 
restriction of private property.2 Furthermore, this decree allowed
the Reich government to assume full authority in any federal state 
when necessary and to institute the death penalty as a deterent to 
serious crimes. Hitler now had the legal power to destroy any 
opposition that might confront him, without fear of retribution. 
This decree provided the legal foundation upon which the Nazi 
regime was based, and simultaneously resulted in the end of the 
Republic. 
The last democratic elections were held on March 5th, and 
the majority of German people still withheld their support of 
Hitler and the Nazi ideals. The final breakdown of the voting re­
vealed the National Socialists had won 43.9 percent, and in conjunc­
tion with the Nationalists, now held a scant 51.9 percent majority. 
This was hardly the resounding victory that had been anticipated, 
Bullock, Hitler, p. 145. 
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particularly in light of all the pressures and schemes Hitler 
and his associates had employed. Yet this last barrier was 
overcome with the passage of the Enabling Act on March 24th, by 
which the Reichstag delegated its legislative power to Hitler. 
The fate of Germany was now grasped firmly in the hands of their 
new Chancellor for the dozen years that the 'thousand-year Reich' 
would stand. 
* * * * * * * * * * 
Editorial Analysis 
As the last remnants of democracy were being stripped 
away from the German nation, journalists seemed bewildered to 
explain the spectacle. The press remained absorbed by the domestic 
issues of this country, particularly President Roosevelt's inaugu­
ration and first hundred days of office. A four day bank holiday 
was declared during this period in order to reorganize the fin­
ancial system, and am embargo on gold was implemented. Little 
attention was given to news originating from Europe, and the 
average American could hardly be expected to piece together an 
intelligent picture of German politics from what information was 
afforded.3 
3 
This information was derived through a sampling of the
headlines of the papers included in this study.
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The burning of the Reichstag provided the excuse and 
the opportunity for Hitler to destroy the Communist Party, yet 
the significance of these events was overlooked by a number of 
papers throughout this country. This is not to suggest that the 
fire and its aftermath were totally ignored, but rather that they 
were ineptly interpreted and little emphasized. 
Four of the papers in this survey refused to accept the 
contrived Nazi explanation which allowed them to persecute their 
Communist rivals. The Richmond Times-Dispatch regarded this 
entire incident as highly political and part of an overall attempt 
by the Nazis to 11 bring about a savage civil war.11 This editorial, 
appearing on March 1st, went on to relate: 11 It is wholly possible 
that the fire started from accidental purposes ... (yet) it would 
not be to Hitler's advantage to view the conflagration as acci­
dental. It would ... be greatly to his advantage (,however,) to 
convince Germany that it was the work of the Communists and that 
the country needs a dictator ... to save it from radicalism. 114 
A similar skepticism about this incident was revealed in 
the New York Times. Both its foreign correspondent, Frederick 
T. Birchell, and an unidentified editor raised the same question
in two related articles on March 2nd, namely: 11What point would 
4 
p. 6.
11 orama in Berlin, 11 Richmond Times-Dispatch, l March 1933,
----- ---- -- --
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there be for the Communists to burn down the Reichstag and 
invite repression a few days before an election which may 
unseat Hitler? 115 Obviously both of these writers suspected the
Nazis were somehow involved in this latest incident. Yet in 
response to charges that Hitler and the Nazis were merely employ­
ing the same tactics which previous administrations had utilized 
against them, the Times succeeded in drawing a major distinction; 
11The democratic authorities employed these methods for the de­
fense of a constitutional regime against a party which openly ... 
(promised) to send heads ... rolling. It was the cause of law and 
order in Germany and the preservation of peace in Europe against 
a party openly preaching civil and for�ign war (which compelled 
the democratic authorities to act).116 This belief was further
illustrated in an editorial cartoon offered on March 26th 
(attached, p. 62) depecting the threat of Hitler's militarism to 
Germany as well as the rest of the world.7
Frederick T. Birchell, 11 Hitler Intensifies Drive On Left; 
Hundred Arrested," New York Times, 2 March 1933, p. 1. See Appendix A. 
11Topics of The Times-Caesar or Nerves? 11 New York Times, 2 
March 1933, p. 11. 
"Topics of The Times-Reprisal or Repression, 11 New York 
Times, 4 March 1933, p. 12. 
11The Misfit, 11 New York Times, 26 March 1933, sec. 4, p. 5. 
5 
------
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Both the Atlanta Constitution and the Chicago Tribune 
shared the opinion that the National Socialists were ultimately 
behind this deed, but they went on to add a unique twist of their 
own to their respective interpretations. Initially the Consti­
tution openly questioned to what extent Hitler 1 s political 
program would ever be implemented, •except for the killings and 
ambushing• of his opponents?8 Yet strangely a few days later it 
went on to say that Hitler 1 s victory would allow 11 Fascist control 
of Germany (to) stabilize and strengthen (the) economic and 
political conditions on the continent.119 Along this same idea,
the Tribune went so far as to defend the Nazis, comparing their 
reprisals to similar action taken by the English, French, and 
Americans following their own revolutions. 11 It is theoretically 
.•. (Hitler 1 s) objective to unite Germany, to free it from the 
limitations imposed by an unjust treaty, and to give it the place 
to which its natural power and accomplishment would entitle it. 
Much of this assumes the sympathy of the rest of the Western 
World. 11 1 ° Certainly both of these papers were in the minority in 
the expression of confidence and optomism which they accorded to 
Hitler and the Nazi regime. 
p. lOA.
11Whither Germany ,S1 Atlanta Constitution, 5 March 1933, 
9 
11Hitler 1 s Victory,S1 Atlanta Constitution, 7 March 1933, p. 4. 
10 
11Hitlerites Amuck, 11 Chicago Tribune, 21 March 1933, p. 8. 
8 
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In contrast to the above opinions, the Dallas Morning 
News and the Washington Post supported the Nazi claim that the 
fire was a prelude to a Communist uprising. In its editorial 
of March 2nd, the News stated it would be unfair to assume the 
current government had actually provoked this incendiary act, 
but: "When any large group (of peop_le) is denied legal freedom 
of expression, illegal acts can be expected from its members ... 
who see no other means of lodging a protest. 1111 Yet as its
editorial cartoon of March 26th (attached, p. 63) indicated, the 
rise of Hitler and other similar dictators was in direct response 
to the dire economic and political conditions already existing.12
Thus the 'mother of dictators• was in reality simple necessity! 
The Washington Post likewise agreed that the Communists 
were behind this deed and expressed relief that a revolution had 
been avoided. 11Germany may have narrowly escaped a violent radical 
outbreak that may have plunged the country into civil strife. The 
firing of the Reichstag ... was said to have been a signal for an 
uprising against the constituted authorities, which was only 
avoided by the prompt action of the police. 1113 The idea that the
11 11 Reichstag 1 s Blaze,11 Dallas Morning News, 2 March 1933, 
secJ·2., p. 2. 
12 11The Mother of Dictators," Dallas Morning News, 26 March 
1933, sec. 3, p. 10. 
13 
p. 5.
11 1ron Hand In Germany, 11 Washington Post, 2 March 1933,
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Republic could ever be safe under the direction and control of 
the Nazis seems ludicrous in hindsight; yet it was the editor's 
belief during this time that any uprising against the 'constituted 
authorities' was even more repugnant than the actions of the 
Hitler regime itself. This same conservative approach was 
evidenced in another editorial printed a few days later which 
said: "There has been much criticism of the harsh measures ... 
employed by Hitler; •.. whether justified or not (however) the 
results of the election shows that Germany has resolved to give 
Hitlerism a trial.1114
Of the several remaining papers in this study, there 
appeared to be a general apathy among them concerning both the 
fire and the election. The Los Angeles Times, for instance, 
simply noted that Hitler had garnered an unimpressive 43.7 percent 
of the seats in the Reichstag, and thus faced an uphill battle in 
gaining a majority. "Hitler has by no means convinced all the 
German people that this scheme is (either) wise or beneficial.1115
The Minneapolis Tribune limited its coverage even further to a few 
small articles by the Associated Press and one short editorial, 
which observed: "There are those who think that a dictator is 
the only solution for America.1116 Finally, the Rocky Mountain News
14 
"Hitler Arrives," Washington Post, 7 March 1933, p. 6. 
15 
"Hitler's Victory," Los Angeles Times, 7 March 1933, 
sec. 2., p. 4. 
16 
"Terrorism in Germany," Minneapolis Tribune, 3 March 
1933, p. l O. 
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offered no editorials whatsoever and presented only a minimal 
number of articles on the event itself. Presumably the impact 
on this occurrence completely escaped the attention of the 
editor as well .as its readers. 
To summarize the coverage given to this event, it is 
noteworthy that over half of the papers included in this study 
either misinterpreted or minimized this increasingly dangerous 
phenomena known as Nazism (see Appendix C). The New York Times 
stood alone in its ability to provide extensive and accurate 
comnentary on these developments. Yet this is hardly surprising, 
considering the resources which this publication had at its 
disposal. 
11 The Misfit," Nevi York Times, 26 March 1933, sec. 4, p. 5. 
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Narrative of Events 
Chapter Five 
THE BLOOD PURGE 
June - July 1934 
64 
The tremendous suffering in Germany that had paved the 
path for Hitler's assumption of power in no way diminished simply 
because he gained the title of Chancellor in 1933. Rumors of a 
'second revolution' continued to spread througout the country, 
and the dissension between the regular Army and the Nazi S.A. 
grew to an alarming level.
1 
The Vice-Chancellor, van Papen, 
recognized the precarious situation Hitler faced and stood ready 
to exploit any opportunity which might present itself to over­
throw the current regime. 
Given these ominous conditions surrounding his second 
year of office, Hitler proceeded with remarkable calm and pre­
cision to assuage the fears of those portions of German society 
which had to be united if the nation were to become a dominant 
force throughout Europe. Knowing he could not afford to ostracize 
the entire military caste that had traditionally played such a 
Shirer, Rise! Fall of the Third Reich, p. 213. 
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major role in German politics, Hitler attempted to win the 
Army's support by attacking his own allies, namely, Ernst 
Roehm and the S.A.2 Corruption and homosexual tendancies in 
the S.A. had recently gained considerable attention in the 
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German press, which in turn caused the Fuhrer some embarrassment. 
It became quite clear that if Hitler hoped to eventually replace 
the legendary Hindenburg as President, he could not continue to 
sanction an organization that offended both the Army and general 
citizenry. The time for reorganization of the Party seemed at 
hand. 
Throughout his discussions with the military high command 
during 1933, Hitler displayed a reluctance to move decisively 
against the forces that had catapulted him into office. Rather 
than disband the S.A. or incorporate it into the Army, as the 
generals demanded, Hitler still believed a more moderate solution 
might be discovered which would spare the Party a shocking blow. 
By the end of June 1934, however, Hitler had become convinced that 
the sacrifice of Roehm and his men in exchange for supreme power 
was hardly unreasonable. 
This �hange of heart could be directly attributed to the 
activities of Goering and Himmler. Both were currently engaged in 
a bitter struggle for power within the Party, and each professed 
2 
Ibid., p. 214. 
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to believe that Roehm was trying to challenge Hitler's authority. 
As the rumors of an overthrow continued to mount, Hitler con­
fronted the S.A. leader with these allegations in hopes of 
reaching an understanding. Roehm vigorously denied any dis­
loyalty, but he agreed to order his men on a general vacation for 
the entire month of July. During this period the troops would 
not be allowed to wear their uniforms or participate in any public 
displays. This was a temporary solution at best, and so the two 
men decided to meet later in June, at the town of Wiessee, to 
continue their discussions.3
Perhaps Roehm and the S.A. might still have been salvaged 
had it not been for von Papen. Taking advantage of Hitler's visit 
to Mussolini's Italy in the second week of June, the Vice-Chancellor 
delivered a scathing attack on the Nazi regime. Upon learning of 
the speech, given at the University of Marburg, Hitler became in­
censed and immediately launched a counter-attack on the 1 pygmy 1
who thought he could stem the tide of National Socialism.4
Goebbels had banned any reproduction of the speech within 
Germany, and Papen became furious at this blatant form of censor­
ship. He demanded that Hitler lift the ban immediately or he 
would submit his resignation. This was a move that Hitler had not 
Bullock, Hitler, p. 161. 
Fest, Hitler, p. 459. 
3 
4 
counted on, and it clearly worried him since Hindenburg had 
threatened to put the entire country under martial law and 
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hand over power to the Army if 'tensions' were not resolved. 5 
When Hitler realized the seriousness of the situation, he decided 
to court the Army's support by suppressing the S.A. swiftly and 
effectively. 
The actual details of the purge were left to the capable 
hands of Goering and Himmler, who had compiled a long list of 
enemies whom they wished to see eliminated. On June 28th the time 
seemed at hand. Hitler left Berlin to attend a wedding at Essen; 
the police and S.S. were put on alert, and the following day the 
executions began. The exact number of people who fell victim to 
this purge has never been definitely established, but Hitler alone 
decided the fate of his old cohart, Ernst Roehm. Speeding to the 
Hanslbauer Hotel in Wiessee, he confronted the S.A. leader, accused 
him of treason and treachery against the regime, and left a gun in 
his room so that fate might take its course. 
Later that same day Hitler returned to Berlin, where Goering 
and Himmler greeted him at the airport and informed him of the events 
in greater detail. The killings continued until Sunday, June 30th, 
and most of the victims met a death as violent as the life they had 
led. The 'blood purge' of 1934 eased the political tensions and won 
Hitler the grudging support of the Army. He was finally the undis­
puted force in Germany. 
* * * * * * * * * * 
Bullock, Hitler, p. 164. 
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Editorial Analysis 
The American press continued to focus sharply on the 
economic developments at home during this period as President 
Roosevelt attempted to lift the nation out of a depression 
through federal regulation and spending. The Public Works Admin­
istration was awarded $25 million for a slum clearance project 
in New York, while a special labor board was created to settle 
the current long shoreman 1 s strike. The President reiterated 
his support for the 'Brain Trust• he had assembled in Washington, 
and a new social program called Social Security was being studied 
by the Cabinet. Joseph P. Kennedy was named chairman of the newly 
formed Securities and Exchange Commission, and Senator Borah 
launched a campaign against the growing bureaucracy associated 
with the New Deal.6 
Yet the newspaper media did not ignore the expanding 
internal strife occurring in Germany during June of 1934. The 
potentially explosive nature of this situation was recognized by 
most of the papers in this country, and no fewer than four of 
those being examined in this survey suggested a showdown of some 
description was imminent between the government and Nazi party. 
The Rocky Mountain News, for example, hinted in its 
editorial of June 29th that the recent propaganda efforts by the 
This information was derived through a sampling of the 
headlines of the papers included in this study.
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National Socialists meant Hitler's regime was at last on the 
offensive. Rumblings of discontent could be heard throughout 
the country, coming not only from the left, but the right as 
we 11. 7 11The future ... of Germany and, to no sma 11 degree, the
entire old world is now in the balance .... For Hitler a showdown 
is fast approaching. 118 Thus while the impending violence was not
predicted outright, certainly the editorials inferred something 
ominous was in the offing. 
The Minneapolis Tribune, in its editorial of June 30th, 
related a similar feeling of apprehension as the fight between 
Hitler's storm troops and the Stahlhelm rose to more intense 
levels. It noted that the current political crisis was likely to 
come to an early conclusion, though it was undecided whom the 
winner would be.9 Additional analysis was provided by an editorial
a few days later, which noted that a man such as Hitler who had 
attained power through violent means was himself susceptible to 
them. 11While these methods may succeed in quelling revolts in 
(their) initial stages, the regime that uses them admits its one 
weakness in doing so. The use of force usually sows the seeds of 
p. 12.
11Thunder On The Right, 11 Rocky Mountain News, 29 June 1934, 
11Whither Germany?, 11 Rocky Mountain News, 3 July 1934, p. 8. 
11The German Reactionaries, 11 Minneapolis Tribune, 30 June 
1934, p. 8. 
7 
8 
9 
revolution and it remains to be seen whether Hitler will not 
fall victim to his own methods.1110 
Two other publications, the Chicago Tribune and the 
Richmond Times-Dispatch, likewise alluded to the impending 
violence in Germany. On June 28th, the Tribune reported that 
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the rivalry between the Nazi storm troops and the regular Army 
was threatening to break into open warfare, and rumors had it 
that Hitler was leaning more towards the latter in his support.
11
Then as the details of the purge gradually became known, one of 
the Tribune's foreign correspondents- Edmond Taylor- colorfully 
summarized the new situation as follows: 11The Brown Shirts •.• 
have vanished overnight from the streets. But the raven black, 
silver trimmed uniforms of the Schutz Staffel •.. today stand watch 
over ... Hitler 1 s third reich- the successor to the empire and the 
republic.1112
The Richmond Times-Dispatch also recognized the struggle 
taking place prior to its actual outbreak, and concluded: 11Those 
10 
p. 4.
ll 
11 Hitler Cracks Down, 11 Minneapolis Tribune, 2 July 1934,
Sigrid Schultz, 11Storm Troops Attacked, 11 Chicago Tribune,
28 June 1934, p. 13. 
12 
Edmond Taylor, 11 Hitler
1 s Crack Guards Take Charge As 
Brown Shirts Disappear From Streets, 11 Chicago Tribune, 2 July
1934, p. 2. See Appendix A. 
who think the Nazi system is likely to undergo fundamental 
changes would at this stage seem more correct than those who 
are looking for an early overthrow of Hitler. 11
13 The paper
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went on to add two days later (July 1st) that while 1 prophecy 1
was impossible, some form of change seemed likely in Germany as 
the people became 1desperate. 114 Again as news of the extent to
which Hitler had 1 purged 1 his opposition became known, the Times­
Dispatch responded with an editorial on July 3rd, dubbing this 
incident 11 the most ruthless massacre known to modern times. 1115 
Furthermore, as the accompanying editorial cartoon (attached -
p. 76) illustrates, could Hitler ultimately succeed in purging
all the other major political forces in Germany in order to 
quench his thirst for a total dictatorship?16
The most thorough and accurate coverage given to this 
event, however, was provided by the New York Times and the Wash­
ington Post. Aside from their extensive day-to-day reports, the 
13 
11Descent From the Mount, 11 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 29 
June 1934, p. 6. 
14 
11A Revolution in Germany, 11 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 
1 July 1934, sec. 3, p. 2. 
15 
11 Heads Shall Roll , 11 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 3 July · 
1934, p. 6. 
16 
Fred Seibel, 11 Can He 
1
1 Purge11 Them-Too?, 11 Richmond 
Times-Dispatch, 3 July 1934, p. 6 . 
Times tried to analyze the basis for the purge itself, while 
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the Post sought to evaluate its overall impact. In a Times 
article by correspondent Eugene Young appearing on July 1st, the 
following conclusion was tendered: 11Hitler sought to establish 
a unitarian, authoritarian state on two contradictions. One was 
the supreme party, which was to end factionalism, but was itself 
divided ...• The other was the dictatorial government, in which 
these ... powers were divided between.irreconcilable elements.11
17
These differences were to lead to what another correspondent 
(Frederick Birchell) termed 'neither a revolution, nor a coup 
d'etat, nor a counter-revolution, but authoritarian action 
intended to head off any of the three.118 This attempt to deal
with the looming internal dissension within Germany was later 
portrayed by the Times in an editorial cartoon carried on July 
8th (attached - p. 77). 19
Similar attention to the plight of the German Republic 
was given by the Washington Post, whose editorial on July 1st 
17 
Eugene Young, 11Long Concealed Rivalry Breaks Bounds 
in Reich,11 New York Times, l July 1934, sec. 4, p. 1. See 
Appendix A. 
18 
Frederick Birchell,. 11Hitler Crushes Revolt by Nazi 
Radicals-Von Schleicher Is Slain, Roehm A Suicide-'Loyal Forces 
Hold Berlin In An Iron Grip,11 New York Times, l July 1934, p. l. 
19 
p. 5.
11The Specter,11 New York Times, 8 July 1934, sec. 4,, 
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noted that Hitle� could not 'indulge in bloody Saturdays for­
ever. 1 20 An editorial the following day stated further: 11The
man whose mission it was to lead Germany out of enslavement has 
dragged his country into a servitude far more degrading than any 
alien conqueror could impose.1121 With remarks such as these, both
the Times and the Post succeeded in providing the most complete 
picture of what was actually happening in Germany among all the 
papers included in this survey. 
The remaining group of publications added unique contri­
butions of their own to the general assessment of the Blood Purge 
in Germany. The Atlanta Constitution compared this incident to 
those involving the famous gangster Al Capone, especially when his 
gang tried to 'muscle' in on him.22 11(A) dictator's road to power
is spattered with blood and littered with the corpses of those who 
stood in his way.1123 As 'hysteria soon turned to slaughter,' 
20 
B, p •. 4:. 
21 
22 
11Gennany 1 s Crisis,11 Washington Post, l July 1934, sec. 
"Stripping The Mask, 11 Washington Post, 2 July 1934, p. 8. 
Paul Mallon, "News Behind the News, 11 Atlanta Constitution, 
4 July 1934, p. 4. See Appendix A. 
23 
11Germany's Blood Bath,11 Atlanta Constitution, 3 July 
1934, p. 6. 
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Hitlerism now stood discredited throughout the world due to 
the recent tact,cs employed to consolidate the Fuhrer's strength. 
The Los Angeles Times offered the opinion that this purge was the 
point "from which the fall of the Hitler regime will be pegged 
by history.1124 As the rest of Europe began to align itself
against her, the internal situation within Germany continued to 
worsen and the Times speculated Hitler's ouster was 'probable.125
�inally, the Dallas Morning News concluded that after further 
reorganization from within the Party occurred, Hitler would 
undoubtedly modify his actions and hopefully restore order. 
"Chancellor Hitler will retain his leadership, but he will 
doubtless ... turn to the Right and become more conservative in 
his policies.1126
While it has become apparent that the editors of the 
papers included in this survey differed quite widely in their 
assessment of Hitler's true intentions, much of this disparity 
could be attributed to the unpredictable nature of the Fuhrer 
himself. Furthermore, while the editors have seemed to become 
extremely reluctant to predict the outcome of the turmoil in 
Germany, often the same arguements and factors used to substantiate 
24 
"The German Situation," Los Angeles Times, 6 July 1934, 
sec. 2, p. 4. 
25 
"The Outlook For Hitler," Los Angeles Times, 29 June 
1934, sec. 2, p. 4. 
26 
"Unrest in Germany," Dallas Morning News, 2 July 1934, 
sec. 2, p. 2. 
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one point of view could be legitimately employed to support 
exactly the opposite position. In this chapter, for instance, 
one group of papers regarded the purge as a process consolidating 
Hitler's power, while another group saw it as evidence of the 
regime's weakness. Both of these conclusions were logical 
and understandable. 
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Chapter Six 
THE PASSING OF A LEGEND AND REARMAMENT 
August 1934 - March 1935 
Narrative of Events 
After Hitler had consolidated his position within the 
Party and simultaneously appeased the Army's demand to bring 
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the S.A. under control, only the ailing and senile von Hindenburg 
obstructed his assumption of total power. It was apparent that 
the aged warrior was rapidly succumbing to the illness that had 
plagued him for years, and Hitler eagerly anticipated the vacancy 
that would be created by his death. The official government 
bulletin on the Field Marshall's health was guarded in its 
assessment, but Hitler dispassionately moved to pass legislation 
to ensure his own succession to power once Hindenburg was gone. 
This new law merged the office of the President with that of the 
Chancellor, based on the power given Hitler via the Enabling Act 
in 1933, though ignoring the guarantees set forth in this measure 
that the office of the Presidency would be inviolate.1 
Fest, Hitler, p. 474. 
1 
Finally, on August 2, 1934, at nine in the morning, 
Hindenburg breathed his last; Hitler 1 s dictatorship could now 
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be consumated in an orderly fashion. The Minister of the Interior 
was instructed to arrange for a plebiscite so that all of Germany 
could confirm and bestow legal sanction on Hitler 1 s power. 
Furthermore, the Army was called upon to pledge unconditional 
support to Hitler. This oath of personal fealty, which would 
forever tie the military to Hitler and his Nazi regime, would allow 
basically 'honorable' men to comit some of the most hideous crimes 
of this century, all in the 'line of duty•.2 This same oath was 
soon required of most government and bureaucratic officials, and 
thereby the image of the monarchy was resurrected within Germany.3
The services for the deceased President gave the Fuhrer 
the opportunity to further consolidate his symbolic and actual 
grasp on the reigns of power. It was a time to eulogize the 
legendary figure who had just passed away, while reminding everyone 
that the wave of the future lay in the ideology of National Socialism 
as interpreted by Adolf Hitler. The Minister of Propaganda, Or. 
Goebbels, produced the proported Last Will and Testament of the 
Bracher, German Dictatorship, pp. 240-43. 
Fest, Hitler, p. 475. 
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President, which contained stirring words of praise for Hitler 
and an appeal that the people of Germany support him. This was 
a particularly effective tool just four days before the plebiscite, 
the results of which were predictable. What Hitler termed the 
people's chance to affirm or deny the policies of its leaders 
became merely a rubber stamp of what had already taken place. 
Yet Hitler was less than enthusiastic at the outcome of 
the voting; for instead of the 100 percent affirmation given in 
most totalitarian states, almost four and a half million voters 
had the courage to reject the Fuhrer and his policies. For some 
elements of the opposition, this vote was the last gasp of indig­
nation and resentment towards a man who had wantonly disregarded 
the Constitution of the Republic and the rights of nearly every 
citizen in Germany. Their protest was futile; the verdict was 
now complete. Roughly ninety percent of the electorate had gone 
along with Hitler's desire to start a 'thousand year Reich' which 
would be unsurpassed by any other nation.4 
The long revolution was supposedly over, but in many ways 
it had just begun. The next move was to restore confidence both 
at home and abroad that things would soon be back to normal and 
Bullock, Hitler, p. 171. 
4 
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that the new government would proceed in an orderly fashion to 
implement programs that would best serve the national interests. 
One of the most important items on this agenda included a directive 
by Hitler himself for the military to begin rearmament. The Army 
was encouraged to triple its size and strength immediately; the 
Navy was to start construction of high tonnage vessels, as well 
as submarines and u-boats; the Air Force was expanded under the 
leadership of Goering and the training of additional combat pilots 
commenced; and the industrial sector of the economy was instructed 
to prepare for the massive effort that would be required to bring 
Germany back to military parity with the rest of Europe.5 All of
these moves were in direct violation of the treaty signed at 
Versailles, yet they were accepted as necessary if Germany was to 
ever become a major power again. 
The only problem remaining concerned the public announce­
ment of what most Allies already knew. Hitler was convinced they 
would accept his actions in exchange for further guarantees about 
collective security, but he was anxious to avoid tying his hands 
by such an agreement. Ultimately the excuse he was looking for 
presented itself when the French decided to double their period for 
military service and lower the age for enlistment; this move allowed 
Hitler the opportunity to justify Germany's own resumption of con­
scription as a necessary response. Throughout Germany he was 
Shirer, Rise� Fall of the Third Reich, pp. 281-84. 
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hailed as a hero, for finally the shackles of Versailles were 
destroyed, and the people could hold up their heads with honor. 
Hitler's gamble had worked, and now his aims for further expan­
sion could proceed. 
* * * * * * * * * * 
Editorial Analysis 
Various domestic events continued to dominate the headlines 
provided by the American press, centering almost exclusively upon 
the figure of Franklin Delano Roosevelt during this interval-the 
man as well as the President. In August of 1934, front-page coverage 
was given to his recent vacation cruise, in addition to his tour of 
the proposed sight of the Grand Coulee Dam. During March of 1934, 
the topic was now Roosevelt's numerous victories in the Senate on 
proposals relating to the various public works projects (i.e. the 
amount of funds to be allocated and the wages to be paid). Yet one 
receives the impression that the developments in Germany were gain­
ing ground on domestic issues in terms of the attention devoted by 
the news media, and the seriousness of this situation abroad was 
gradually becoming felt.6
The American press was virtually unanimous in its acknow­
ledgement of the accomplishments of the aged Field Marshall, both 
This information was derived through a sampling of the 
headlines of the papers.included in this study. 
6 
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as a political and military leader. One of the real giants-of· 
his day, possibly no other paper offered more stirring words of 
praise for von Hindenburg than the Washington Post. In its 
editorial of August 3rd, it stated: "There are periods in history 
when the entire race of man ... is for a moment struck silent by 
the awful significance of some terrestrial event .... (The) name 
and fame of Paul van Hindenburg are safe with the immortals. 
History will (indeed) probably regard this stern old Prussian in 
much the same manner it regards ... Robert E. Lee. Both were great 
leaders of men. 11 7 A similar assessment was offered by a former
war correspondent for the Post who knew von Hindenburg personally, 
Col. Edwin Emerson .. His articl� spoke of the near universal grief 
now being experienced in Germany as the 'grand old man 1 passed 
away.8 Finally, one other foreign correspondent, Aniou Angelo,
noted the beginning of a new era for Germany- as the last remaining 
bond between the old and the new was now severed with Hindenburg's 
death.9
p. 8.
11The Majesty of Defeat, 11 Washington Post, 3 August 1944, 
Col. Edwin Emerson, "Germans Mourn Their 11Grand Old Man11
as a Father, 11 Hashington Post, 5 August 1934, sec. 2, p. l. See 
Appendix A. 
Anious Angelo, "Europe Fearful As Germany Loses Hindenburg's 
Stability, 11 Washington Post, 5 ·August 1934, sec. 2, p. 5. See 
Appendix A. 
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Although Hindenburg 1 s death itself commanded tremendous 
attention, the consequences of his passing to Germany and the 
rest of the world were also in the forefront of the news. The 
Los Angeles Times pointed to an alarming new European crisis, 
as the Nazis and Junkers struggled to gain control over a powerful 
nation. Furthermore: 11 Hitler 1 s accession to complete power will
be viewed with favor nowhere outside Germany. It will aid in 
completing the isolation of the Reich. 1110 The Minneapolis Tribune 
believed, in fact, that Hindenburg had been the only man either in 
or out of government capable of keeping the extremist policies of 
the Nazis in check. Now, ominously, the buffer was irrevocably 
withdrawn. The only consolation the Tribune could offer was 
simply: 11While the world may be most concerned about the immediate
future of Germany, in learning of the death of Der Alte, it is not 
left without the hope that a people that could produce a van Hinden­
burg and admire him as it did will not surrender itself completely 
to a course in human affairs that is beneath it. 11 1 1 
The Richmond Times-Dispatch related similar feelings of 
apprehension concerning the vast power which Hitler now wielded in 
10 
11 New European Crisis, 11 Los Angeles Times, 2 August 1934,
sec. 2, p. 4. 
11 
11The Death of a Soldier, 11 Minneapolis Tribune, 3 August
1934, p. 14. 
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Germany.12 Yet is also noted the somber reality that there
was no one for the people to rally around even if they so 
desired.13 Thus the total repercussions of von Hindenburg's 
passing were still uncertain for Germany- as the editorial cartoon 
of August 3rd (attached, p. 92) seems to indicate. 14 The New
York Times concurred, and in its editorial of August 2nd, noted 
that Hindenburg had stood before the Reich as 'the pillar' of a 
nation's hope.15 Now, as one foreign correspondent for the Times­
Otto D. Tolischus- put it; 11At a critical moment in her history 
Germany has lost another pilot. Cut adrift from the moorings of 
the past, she is like a ship in a brown setting out on a turbulent 
sea, under the command of a man with a strong, arbitrary will. 
Already she is being buffeted by whirlwinds of world hostility.11 16
12 
"Hindenburg's Heir," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 2 August 
1934, p. 6. 
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11Hitler at the Top," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 4 August 
1934, p. 4. 
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"After Hindenburg-What?" Richmond Times-Dispatch, 3 
August 1934, p. 10. 
15 
"Hindenburg," New York Times, 2 August 1934, p. 16. 
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Otto D. Tolischus, 11 German Anxious Over Nazi Course, 11 
New York Times, 3 August 1934, p. 1. See Appendix A. 
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Where this man, Adolf Hitler, was to lead Germany and the rest 
of the world was still unknown- but it was felt the power which 
he now had at his command remained 11unequaled ... since the days
of Genghis Kahn. 1117 
In marked contrast to the opinions offered above, most 
of the remaining publications in this study suggested that Hinden­
burg 1 s passing would have only a minimal impact in the final 
analysis. The Atlanta Constitution, for example, believed this 
development would simply eliminate the need for the empty gestures 
of Hitler obtaining the President 1 s approval for policies he 
intended to implement anyway. 11 In the last analysis, the death
of Hindenburg and Hitler 1 s succession to the presidency will ... 
cause but little change in existing conditions.1118 The Chicago
Tribune further emphasized that Hindenburg's influence had been 
diminishing for quite some time, and he was little deterent to 
the Nazi movement at the time of his death. 11We must ... guess at
the effect the removal of the great man will have upon the internal 
conditions and external relations of Germany and the world. (Yet) 
we may assume that it will not be as momentous as it might have 
been earlier ... in Germany.1119 
17 
Frederick Birchell, "Hitler Endorsed 9 to l In Poll On 
His Dictatorship, But Opposition is Doubled," New York Times, 
20 August 1934, p. 1. 
· 18 
"Hitler Tightens The Reins, 11 Atlanta Constitution, 3
August 1934, p. 8. 
19 
"Hindenburg Departs," Chicago Tribune, 3 August 1934, p. 12. 
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The remaining two papers, the Dallas Morning News and 
the Rocky Mountain News, shared the belief that the once great 
giant who had led Germany in the past had become but a feeble old 
man looking for his eternal rest. The Dallas paper noted in its 
editorial of August 3rd; "Had death ended his vigorous old age 
at the moment when his personal popularity had defeated the present 
Chancellor in the race for the chief official post of the Republic 
.•.  there would have been no subsequent obscuring of the famous 
soldier.1120 And finally along this same line, the Rocky Mountain
News said: "Maybe history's verdict will be that the eyes of the 
weary giant had seen too much of strife, the great heart leaped 
too often to the call of courage; that he who bent before the 
Nazi weaklings was not Von Hindenburg, the idol, but an enfeebled 
old man waiting for the grave.1121
Turning to the subsequent issue of rearmament, the action 
itself was greeted with mixed emotions, ranging from quiet 
acceptance to utter surprise and anguish. The latter opinion was 
particularly obvious in the Atlanta Constitution and Los Angeles 
Times, which predicted the reaction of the other nations of the 
world would be to isolate Germany completely. As the editorial 
carried in the Constitution on March 19th stated flatly: "The 
chief result of the Hitler defiance ... will be to bring about a 
20 
"President Von Hindenburg," Dallas Morning News, 3 
August 1934, sec. 2, p. 2. 
21 
"Hindenburg," Rocky Mountain News, 3 August 1934, p. 10 
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close defensive a11iance between Great Britain, France, Italy 
and Russia. Such an a11iance ... wou1d build an iron ring around 
Germany, and the nation would be far more he1p1ess than it is 
now. 1122 The Times concurred and added: "The general consensus
seems to be that Hit1er 1 s new 1 putsch 1 • • •  will result in a new 
ring of alliances (around Germany).1123 Yet these ominous develop­
ments were not new to Europe, as pointed out in an editorial 
carried by the Richmond Times-Dispatch on March 24th. 11There 
would seem to be a sinister significance ... in the fact that 
events prior to the World War are so similar to those in recent 
days. It is to be fervently hoped, however, that the ultimate 
denouement wi11 be far different ... (and) the nations of Europe 
will not ... be dragged once more into the bloody maelstrom of 
war ... 24
A number of the other papers included in this study were 
reluctant to condemn Hit1er 1 s actions, seeking instead to remind 
the public that the Allies were partially to blame themselves. 
The Minneapolis Tribune called the idea of 'an unarmed Germany in 
22 
11 Hitler 1 s Bold Step,11 Atlanta Constitution, 19 March 
1935, p. 6. 
23 
"Isolating Germany, 11 Los Angeles Times, 19 March 1935, 
sec. 2, p. 4. 
24 
"Ominous Parallel," Richmond Times-Dispatch, 24 March 
1935, sec. 4, p. 2. 
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the midst of an armed European community' an anomaly which 
could only exist temporarily.25 The Washington Post went even
further by calling rearmament a matter of national honor. 11To 
her it is more than a matter of life and death. It is a matter 
of the fundamental honor of an organized people .... The clauses 
of enforced disarmament are binding upon Germany only on the 
assumption that she is a servile state. And no other peace treaty 
in modern history ever attempted this. 1126 (Note the editorial 
cartoon appearing on the same day attached at the end of this 
27chapter, p. 93.) 
The several remaining publications (including the Chicago 
Tribune, the Dallas Morning News, and the New York Times) concen­
trated almost exclusively upon the enthusiasm and support of the 
German people for rearmament, rather than the shockwaves which it 
sent throughout the world. The Tribune's correspondence, Sigrid 
Schultz, reported the reaction as being 'delirious' among the 
25 
11The Failure of Disarmament, 11 Minneapolis Tribune, 
19 March 1935, p. 6. 
26 
"Germany Breaks Her Fetters," Washington Post, 18 March 
1935, p. 8. 
27 
Gene Eldermann, 11Stormy Weather, 11 Washinaton Post, 18 
March 1935, p. 8. 
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Germans.28 The News called it a 1sensation.129 With this
single stroke Hitler had succeeded in uniting the country 
behind him, and as one Times article stated, all Germans shall 
11rise up and cheer ... Hitler's challenge to the world.1130
The final paper in this survey, the Rocky Mountain News, 
looked upon this situation with grave reservations. It saw this 
latest action as simply a part of the same old power game in 
Europe. Thus the United States should stay alert to the possi­
bility of becoming entangled in another foreign war. To this 
end, the News stated in its editorial of March 19 th: 11We believe 
it is the duty of an American newspaper to help keep the nation 
from becoming involved in another nation's quarrel .... America 
has its own mission in the world ... (and) its own people and ... 
shores to protect.1131 
Although the editors continued to differ in their inter­
pretations, gradually a consensus began to emerge. Furthermore, 
28 
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30 
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the coverage provided to these developments in Germany continued 
to expand in each of these papers. These two observations are 
probably related, since both could be attributed to a growing 
awareness of the seriousness of the situation in Europe. 
"After Hi ndenburg--l�hat? 11 Richmond Times-Dispatch 
3 August 1934, p. 10. 
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Chapter Seven 
THE REPUDIATION OF LOCARNO AND MOVEMENT INTO THE RHINELAND 
March 1936 
Narrative of Events 
94 
For the remainder of 1935 and into the early part of 1936, 
Hitler watched with anxious anticipation for the right moment 
whereby he could achieve another coup in foreign policy. With 
the League of Nations enbroiled in a losing effort to stem Italy's 
aggression in Ethiopia, an opening was created for Hitler to 
exploit the existing controversy surrounding the Franco-Soviet 
Mutual-assistance pact.1 The Fuhrer met with the French ambassador, 
Francois-Poncet, on November 21, 1935, to voice his protests against 
the pact, leaving the emissary with the distinct impression that 
he had every intention of using this treaty as an excuse to march 
troops into the demilitarized Rhineland. Little did the French 
know that preparations had been made as early as the previous spring 
by General Blomberg to accomplish exactly that aim. The only 
question still lingering was when. 
Within France, the issue of an alliance with the Soviets had 
caused considerable controversy among the more conservative elements 
of the society. Hitler was, in fact, fearful that the French Chamber 
Fest, Hitler, p. 496. 
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might reject th� proposal, and then he would be forced to find 
another pretext upon which to justify his plans.2 When th� pact
was decisively ratified on February 27th, Hitler felt the time 
was right to go ahead with his scheme. 
While most of the German generals were wary of taking 
military action in the face of potentially superior forces, Hitler 
was firm in his belief that the Allies lacked both the nerve and 
resolve to oppose him. Despite numerous reservations, Blomberg 
gave the order for the army to move, while everyone waited breath­
lessly to see what would happen. The token German force met with 
no resistance, and thus victory seemed to hinge on the willingness 
of France and Britain to become involved in armed conflict. 
In retrospect it is apparent that this was a major turning 
point for all of Europe. Had the Allies taken the initiative to 
resist Hitler and his expansionist policies on this occasion, 
-they could easily have defeated him and the history of the twentieth
century may have been drastically altered. The Germans were both
outnumbered and outgunned, with no 'legal' justification for their
obvious breach of the Treaty of Locarno. Yet Hitler had always
been ingenious in his use of the element of surprise, and he
wielded the weapon so effectively that it created doubt and inde­
cision on the part of his adversaries. Knowing the French were
currently facing severe economic problems at home, in addition to
Shirer, Rise! Fall of the Third Reich, pp. 290-94. 
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political strife in several areas, he correctly judged that the 
present administration was in no position to challenge him,at 
this time. 
On the morning of March 7th, while the German Army pro­
ceeded into the Rhineland, the Foreign Minister calmly advised 
the British, French, and Italian ambassadors of this latest move, 
and the 'compelling' reasons they had for abandoning the Treaty.3
Then as a bitter twist to the melodrama currently unfolding, 
Hitler called for a new peace treaty to be established among the 
major powers of Europe. He claimed that Germany had not been 
eager to rearm or to reoccupy the Rhineland, for he argued, it 
was France who had betrayed the Allies by signing an agreement 
with Russia, thereby nullifying the Treaty of Locarno. Hitler 
had only responded by taking the steps which he felt were neces­
sary to defend the national interests of Germany, and peace 
remained a primary objective in his own mind. The rhetoric 
seemed to work, and once again Hitler had gambled and won! 
This small military venture added immensely to his already 
wide popularity at home, and it also taught his subordinates never 
to question his judgment. This one token victory was also to 
enhance his confidence for further military expansion, while con­
firming his suspicions that appeasement could be a useful tool in 
Bullock, Hitler, pp. 190-91. 
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diplomacy. He called upon the people of Germany to voice their 
opinion at the polls, and the results were overwhelming. Approxi­
mately ninety-nine percent of the electorate supported his actions, 
and the Fuhrer was now in a position to embark upon his great 
dream of creating an unparalled German civilization which would 
spread throughout the world. 
* * * * * * * * * * 
Editorial Analysis 
The events in Europe were now being regarded as serious 
enough to warrant closer coverage in the newspapers. On the 
domestic front, the President had recently signed a neutrality 
bill aimed at avoiding American entanglement in Europe, while 
businessmen were urged to refrain from capitalizing on foreign 
conflicts. A new farm aid package was passed in Congress, and a 
proposal to increase corporate taxes was under consideration. 
The Presidential race was also beginning to heat up during this 
period, as Republicans sought to raise $1 million for the upcoming 
campaign.4
Turning to the developments in Europe, the reaction to 
Hitler's move to expand his power and influence was generally 
This information was derived through a sampling of the 
headlines of the papers included in this study. 
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mixed. The press displayed both apprehension and uncertainity, 
and even at this late stage there appeared a wide diversity of 
opinion as to the direction in which Germany was going. Many 
of the publications involved in this study regarded this overt 
military move into the Rhineland as proof that war was in the 
offing; others maintained that this was little more than a 
symbolic flexing of Hitler's newly found strength. 
One of the more popular explanations to Hitler's Rhine-
land venture suggested that war was his ultimate aim. This 
belief was shared by the editors and staff of the Atlanta Consti­
tution, the Chicago Tribune, and the Rocky Mountain News. The 
only real distinction among their views centered around the 
question of timing for Hitler's next act of aggression. The 
Rocky Mountain News held the opinion that war was just around the 
corner, as it colorfully described in its editorial of March 10th: 
11The prospects for European or perhaps world war were bright enough 
last week ... now they are blinding .... It's a cockeyed-world .•. slanted 
and twisted awry. 115 A similar expression of concern was voiced by
the Chicago Tribune, which related in its editorial on the event: 
11 If the so-ca 11 ed statesmen who imposed the treaty upon Germany had
shown something resembling political and economic prudence ... there 
probably would have been no Nazi revolution; the time has come when 
11This Cock-Eyed World, 11 Rocky Mountain News, 10 March 
1936, p. 8. 
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the dictator must obtain foreign victories, either of diplomacy 
or war .... Hitler is plainly at that point now. 118 (Note the 
editorial cartoon carried on March 12th - attached, p. 104, 
which effectively illustrates this position.) 7 Finally the
Atlanta Constitution emphasized the long-term implications of 
Hitler's actions, while admitting the move had been brillantly 
timed psychologically. The other nations of Europe were currently 
preoccupied with critical internal problems of their own, and were 
unlikely to respond militarily to this newest venture.8 "The
whole ... movement is being classified in diplomatic files as 
another event which will lead up to war in a year or so, but 
probably not (any) sooner.119 
Another group of papers assumed exactly the opposite 
stance about the likelihood of war and offered evidence to support 
their position. The Dallas Morning News, for example, believed 
that Germany would in all probability retain control of the Rhine-
"Versailles Again,11 Chicago Tribune, 10 March 1936, p. 12. 
"The War Makers," Chicago Tribune, 12 March 1936, sec. ?, 
p. 1.
"Europe's Cauldron Fumes,11 Atlanta Constitution, 10 March 
1936, p. 6. 
Paul Mallon, "News Behind The News," Atlanta Constitution, 
10 March 1936, p. 6. 
6 
7 
8 
9 
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land and that o�ly 'paper protests' would follow. "The results 
(are in) the laps of the gods. It is almost to be assumed that 
Italy will join Germany in renouncing the Locarno Pact. France 
would like to act against Germany but must first appeal to the 
League ... England, it may be sure, will not pledge to go to war 
with France against Germany ... (but will) seek to preserve peace.1110
The editorial ·of March 10th in the Minneapolis Tribune was equally 
realistic in pointing out the ineffectiveness of any treaty to 
guarantee peace, especially one that was both punitive and humil­
iating in nature. War remained no more inevitable now than it had 
been over the preceding years. "It seems to be generally agreed 
in the principal capitals of the world that Germany's action ... 
need not mean war ... (For) it is important to recognize that the 
treaties which are being destroyed are suffering that fate, in 
part at least, because they were called upon to perform an impos­
sible task .... They sought to impose restrictions on the sovereignty 
of Germany which none of the other signatories of treaties would 
accept for itself.111
1 
The Washington Post agreed with this analysis,
and recalled the proverb which said a 'dog that barks doesn't 
10 
"The Bit in His Teeth," Dallas Morning News, 9 March 1936, 
sec. 2, p. 2. 
11 
What Are Treaties Worth," Minneapolis Tribune, 10 March 
1936, p. 16. 
bite. 1 Thus in regards to the current situation, the more 
warnings we received about the impending violence, the less 
likely it was to occur.12
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While most of the publications included in this survey 
concerned themselves almost exclusively with the pros and cons 
of Hitler launching a more extensive military venture, the remain­
ing papers cited various other issues which they considered to be 
of equal importance. The Los Angeles Times, for instance, re­
garded the recent events as part of an elaborate chess game among 
the assorted European nations designed for better positioning. 
Since each of the signatories of the Locarno Treaty had repeat­
edly violated the terms, why had Hitler chosen this particular 
time to act, unless it was simply a well-calculated bluff to 
gain a small diplomatic victory?13 Further inconsistencies in
Hitler's behavior were also cited, specifically his remilitariza­
tion of the Rhineland one day and his offer to initiate peace 
negotiations the next. 11 Hitler 1 s plea of justification for violat­
ing the Locarno Treaty because ..• France did so first hardly holds 
water •.. (Yet this) is not his only inconsistency .... He tears up 
12 
Countess of Listowel (Special ·correspondent), 11 War in 
Europe?, 11 Washington Post 9 March 1936, p. 9. See Appendix A. 
13
11 It Is France's Move, 11 Los Angeles Times, 8 March 1936, 
sec. 2, p. 2. 
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treaties with one hand and tenders fresh ones with the other. 
With saber drawn, he offers to lead Europe into new paths of 
peace.11 14 (Note the editorial cartoon of March 9th - attached, 
p. 105, carried in the Times which illustrates this point.) 15
In contrast to this line of thinking, the New York Times 
focused most of its headlines and attention on the singular 
issue of whether or not England would come to the assistance of 
France in this matter. As one foreign correspondent for the 
Times, Edwin James, reported in his article, the extent of the 
current crisis could well turn on the attitude of London in 
reaching a settlement.1 6 What the British position would be re­
mained to be seen, yet Charles Selden (correspondent) for the 
Times offered his belief following a speech by the British Foreign 
Secretary Anthony Eden. 11The British Government makes a distinction 
between German troops reoccupying their own territory and an invasion 
of French territory, (thus it appears) the British have no intention 
14 
"A Squeeze Play?,11 Los Angeles Times, 10 March 1936, sec. 
2, p. 4. 
15 
"Nazi Movement!," Los Angeles Times, 10 March 1936, sec. 
2, p. 4. 
16 
Edwin James, 11Germany Tears Up Treaty of Locarno,11 New 
York Times, 8 March 1936, sec. 4, p. 3. 
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of giving milit�ry aid to France if she decides to use force to 
compel Germany once more to evacuate the forbidden zone. 1117 
Finally, the Richmond Times-Dispatch showed unique 
insight in its attempt to identify with the German people, rather 
than the government that was supposedly representing them. 11Thi s 
newspaper has the utmost sympathy (for) the German people- as 
distinguished from the gang which is in control of their country­
and it would like to see that people receive justice at the hands 
of the victors in the World War. But it is frankly suspicious of 
the assurances (of) their self-appointed spokesman-(Adolf 
Hitler). 1118 
In surranary, even by the year 1936 there was still no firm 
consensus of opinion as to the developments in Germany. Further­
mor�, there was actually a wider range of editorial views expressed 
in this chapter than in the preceding one. Yet a growing awareness 
and appreciation of the problems abroad led to an expanded coverage 
of the European situation. Consequently, even papers which had 
been previously apathetic attempted to upgrade their standards. 
17 
Charles Selden, 11 London Will Seek To Restrain Paris, 11 
New York Times, 9 March 1936, p. 1. See Appendix A. 
18 
11Hitler Seizes the Rhine, 11 Richmond Times-Dispatch, 
8 March 1936� sec. 4, p. 2. 
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CONCLUSION 
The original aim of this study was to assess the extent 
to which the American public was aware of the events occurring 
in Germany between the years 1930-1936. While definitive answers 
to the question of public awareness are virtually impossible, it 
appears from this critical survey that the press did remarkably 
well in keeping the public informed of the ongoing developments. 
The editors normally offered a wide variety of opinions, but they 
almost never ignored the incidents themselves. 
Among the papers examined, the New York Times provided ---
the most extensive and accurate coverage of Hitler's career. 
Not only did the Times recognize the threat posed by National 
Socialism to the rest of the world at a very early stage, but it 
constantly displayed an uncanny ability to correctly assess the 
direction in which Hitler was moving. The Chicago Tribune and 
Washington Post likewise devoted a tremendous amount of space to 
the German situation, yet the slant to their articles was often 
devoid of any long range implications. The Tribune tended to 
focus on the human drama currently unfolding as the people of 
Germany reacted to Hitler, while the Post assumed such a conserva­
tive or guarded stance that it frequently minimized the underlying 
significance to Hitler's position. 
Furthermore, it may be �ignificant that each of these 
papers were among the four included in this survey which utilized 
1W 
foreign correspondents quite freely. While the by-line articles 
of these reporters were predominantly narratives of the events, 
rather than the analysis which might have been expected, it is 
still interesting to note the greater attention and consistency 
shown in the editorials of these publications. 
Four of the papers included in this study (the Atlanta 
Constitution, the Dallas Morning News, the Richmond Times-Dispatch, 
and the Rocky Mountain News) provided only modest attention to the 
disputes abroad and limited most of their commentary to a reflection 
of the events after they had already occurred. Possibly this could 
be explained by the initial trouble they experienced in interpreting 
Hitler's actions and the reluctance which understandably followed 
in regards to making any further predictions. Finally, the two 
remaining newspapers, the Los Angeles Times and Minneapolis Tribune, 
seemed relatively less concerned with the situation in Europe versus 
domestic affairs. Since it is doubtful that a paper could survive 
for long without addressing the interests of its readers, this 
would tend to imply that isolationist attitudes still prevailed 
among their subscribers. 
In summary, Hitler and National Socialism did not spring 
up overnight; their gradual development attracted considerable media 
attention. During the period from 1930 to 1936, the press gradually 
expanded the extent of its coverage ·and the quality of its analysis 
of international affairs, and began to prepare the American people 
for a world in which they could no longer afford to remain aloof. 
APPENDIX A 
Biographical Information 
Aniou Angelo 
A foreign correspondent for the Washington Post, no further 
information was available. 
Frederick T. Birchell 
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Described as a 'spritely little Englishman', Mr. Birchell became 
one of the foreign editors for the New York Times in 1925. By 
1936, he succeeded in becoming the chief of the Times foreign 
service, and was credited with much of the paper's success in 
this field. For more information, see John Hohenberg's work 
Foreign Correspondence - The Great Reporters and Their Times. 
Gene Eldermann 
An editorial cartoonist for the Washington Post, Mr. Eldermann 
was noted for being 'none too abstemious or dedicated' to his 
work. Yet few outside the newspaper profession realize just how 
important an effective cartoon is to convey the correct impression. 
For further information see Felix Morley's book entitled For the 
Record. 
Col. Edwin Emerson 
Born in Dresden, Saxony on January 23, 1869. After rece1v1ng 
his A.B. degree from Harvard University in 1891, he later married 
Mary Griswol in 1906. A member of the National Press Club, he 
served many years as a foreign and war correspondent in Europe, 
and occasionally wrote articles for the Washington Post. 
Guido Enderis 
Born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin on September 3, 1874, of Swiss parent­
age, Mr. Enderis went to Germany as a foreign correspondent in 
1916, and was interned there during World War I. He joined the 
Associated Press in Berlin in 1917, and by 1929 was head of the 
New York Times bureau there. Soon after the start of World War 
Uhe was evacuated to Switzerland, where he suffered a stroke in 
1945. He was never married, and died in April of 1948. 
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Edwin L. James 
Born in Irvington, Virginia on June 25, 1890, he attended Chesa­
peake Academy for his primary school education. He received his 
A.B. degree from Randolph Macon College in 1909, and married 
Simone Tremoulet in 1918. Originally a reporter for the Baltimore 
Sun, he joined the New York Times in 1915 as a war correspondent. 
He became the chief European correspondent during the late 1920's, 
and the managing editor of the Times in 1932. He was a member of 
the Phi Beta Kappa society. 
John F. Knott 
Born in Austria on December 17, 1878, he attended both the Royal 
Academy of Art in Munich, Bavaria, and the Holmes School of Illus­
tration in Chicago. He married Carrie Louise Bowen of Dallas, 
Texas, in 1907. Mr. Knott joined the staff of the Dallas Morning 
News in 1905 as a cartoonist. 
Frederick R. Kuh 
Born in Chicago, Illinois on October 10, 1895, he obtained his 
Ph.D. from the University of Chicago in 1917. He married Renata 
Boern of Vienna, Austria, in 1929. Originally a reporter for the 
Chicago Herald, he became the European correspondent for the London 
Daily Herald in 1921. By 1924, Mr. Kuh was a special correspondent 
for the United Press Association in Europe, and occasionally con­
tributed articles to the Atlanta Constitution. 
Countess of Listowel 
No information was available. 
Paul Ma 11 on 
Born in Mattoon, Illinois on January 5, 1901, he attended both 
the University of Louisville and University of Notre Dame as an 
undergraduate. Mr. Mallon began as a reporter for the Louisville 
Carrier Journal in 1918, and joined the United Press in 1920. He 
married Viola Wingreene in 1929, and inaugurated a Washington 
column called the 'News Behind the News' in the early 1930's. 
This column was frequently carried by the Atlanta Constitution. 
Anne O'Hare McCormick 
Described as a small, red-headed woman, Mrs. McCormick wrote free­
lance articles while traveling with her husband across Europe. 
She was noted for having 'something extra' in her works, conveying 
what might have been called a sense of history. Additional infor­
mation can be obtained in the book by Hohenberg. 
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James North 
While the editor of the Washington Post began to add editorial 
cartoons in the early 1920 1 s, most of these were originally 
obtained from syndicates. Mr. North joined the staff in the 
mid-1920 1 s and his works appeared regularly over a decade. For 
more information consult Chalmers M. Roberts• work: The Washington 
Post - The First 100 Years. 
Henry K. Norton 
Born in Chicago, Illinois in October of 1884, Mr. Norton had an 
extensive college background in which he earned his B.S., LL.B., 
and M.A. degrees. The author of numerous books, he contributed 
works to the New York Times and various other joutnals. For 
additional information consult Who's Who Among North American 
Authors, vol. VI. 
Sigrid Schultz 
Born in Chicago, Illinois, Mr. Schultz received his college educa­
tion at the University of Berlin. He became a foreign correspondent 
for the Chicago Tribune in 1919, and by 1925 was put in charge of 
the office there. He was also a member of the Federation Inter­
nationale des Journalistes. 
Frederick Seibel 
Born in Durhamville, New York in October of 1886, Mr. Seibel studied 
under many famous artists throughout this country. He began his 
career as a commercial artist in 1911, and became a cartoonist for 
the Utica Herald-Dispatch in 1915. He became an editorial cartoonist 
for the Richmond Times-Dispatch in 1926, and received the Harmon 
award for his work in 1926. He was married to Edna Anderson of 
New York. 
Charles A. Selden 
Born in Nantucket, Massachusetts on October 10, 1870, Mr. Selden 
received his A.B. degree from Brown University in 1893. He began 
his journalist career as a reporter for the Providence Journal in 
1893, and ultimately joined the staff of the New York Times in 1918. 
Edmond Taylor 
A foreign correspondent for the Chicago Tribune, no information 
was available. 
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Otto Tolischus 
Described as a calm, determined, professional newsman, Mr. 
Tolischus graduated from Columbia University and received his 
initiation into journalism in a Cleveland city newsroom. His 
first European assignment was given to him by the International 
News Service, and he later went to work for the New York Times. 
Additional information is provided in the book by Hohenberg. 
Joseph Willetts 
Born in 1887, Mr. Willetts joined the staff of the Dallas Morning 
News in 1923. Prior to this time he'had worked at the Denver 
Post, the New York Times, and the Rocky Mountain News. As the 
assistant managing editor of the Dallas Morning News, he died at 
the age of 51 at Baylor University. 
Eugene Young 
A foreign correspondent for the New York Times, no additional 
information could be located. 
**Unless otherwise indicated, further information on each of 
these journalists can be obtained in the appropriate volumn 
of Who's Who in America. --
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This is a subjective observation, determined on the basis of 
relative coverage given to a particular event in this study. 
It is not an attempt to directly quantify the actual coverage, 
but to convey an impression which was provided to the author 
through the research itself. 
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APPENDIX C 
Accuracy of Analysis 
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This is a subjective observation, determined on the basis of 
relative coverage given to a particular event in this study. 
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